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FEDERALISM AS DOCKET CONTROL* 
JASON MAZZONE** & CARL EMERY WOOCK*** 
On the twentieth anniversary of United States v. Lopez (1995), 
this Article revisits the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution. 
Much of what has been said about the federalism cases of the 
Rehnquist Court misses a fundamental aspect of those 
decisions—one with profound implications for making sense not 
just of the Rehnquist era but a large component of the Supreme 
Court’s work since the earliest days of the Republic. Focusing 
particularly on Lopez and the follow-up case of United States v. 
Morrison (2000), this Article offers a new perspective on what 
the Rehnquist Court was up to. We set forth a practical reading 
of Lopez and Morrison as cases about docket control. In both 
cases, we suggest, the Court was concerned, at least in part, with 
shielding the federal district courts from ever-expanding criminal 
and civil cases that resulted from new federal laws. This Article 
shows that, from the Court’s perspective, docket control was not 
simply about keeping the caseloads of the district courts at a 
manageable level. Instead, quite apart from numbers, the Court 
was concerned with the particular types of cases Congress was 
requiring the district courts to handle. Congress, the Justices 
feared, was undermining the prestige of the federal judiciary by 
blurring the distinction between state and federal judges and 
turning federal judges into petty magistrates. Docket control was 
thus about protecting the integrity of the third branch of 
government—a mechanism, in other words, that began in 
federalism but also served separation of powers. While we draw 
on a variety of sources in presenting our account, this Article 
relies heavily on a rich and surprisingly underused resource: the 
annual testimony by Supreme Court Justices before 
congressional committees in support of the Court’s annual 
budgetary requests. These hearings document candid comments 
by the Justices on a range of issues, including a deep concern 
with Congress’s treatment of the lower federal courts. Indeed, 
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read with the benefit of hindsight, the hearings show the Justices 
shortly prior to Lopez and Morrison forecasting the outcomes in 
those cases and articulating an overlooked rationale underlying 
the decisions. 
Our account provokes a rethinking of the constitutional 
justification for Lopez and Morrison (and other federalism 
decisions of the Rehnquist Court). The two cases, we show, 
represented the culmination of more than a century of efforts by 
the Supreme Court to safeguard the role of the judicial branch in 
our constitutional system. Doctrinally, Lopez and Morrison 
involved questions of the scope of congressional power and the 
degree of deference courts owe to Congress when it legislates. By 
centering on these issues, however, debate over the outcomes in 
Lopez and Morrison has overlooked a more basic justification 
for the Court’s rulings. When the Court acts to protect the 
judiciary—and particularly when it does so after repeated 
requests to Congress for help—it is on firmer constitutional 
ground than critics of Lopez and Morrison have recognized. At 
the time of Lopez and Morrison, the federal courts were under 
considerable stress and there was no indication that Congress—
continuing to create new federal causes of action—would provide 
relief. Under those circumstances, the Court’s response, 
invalidating one criminal statute (in Lopez) and one civil cause 
of action (in Morrison), was less revolutionary than 
preservationist. 
The significance of our account extends beyond explaining a 
single episode in the history of the Supreme Court. Once cast in 
terms of docket control, Lopez and Morrison represent not a 
break—revolutionary or otherwise—but the culmination of a 
much longer history of overburdened (and underappreciated) 
federal judges pushing back against congressional demands to 
perform tasks that would distract them from their core functions 
under the Constitution. Apart from the federalism decisions of 
the Rehnquist Court, many cases—many landmark cases—are 
better understood in the new light of docket control. We even 
offer a new reading of Marbury v. Madison. While at first blush 
docket control may seem less exciting than other accounts of 
Supreme Court cases, it helps make sense of a good deal of the 
Court’s role, and it provides a new lens through which to 
examine and assess judicial decision making. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 7 (2015) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago, in United States v. Lopez,1 the Supreme Court 
struck down the Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which 
criminalized possession of guns within one thousand feet of a school.2 
As the first decision since the New Deal invalidating a federal statute 
as beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause,3 Lopez 
generated intense interest. Commentators (including some judges) 
described Lopez in revolutionary terms.4 As the Court issued a series 
 
 1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 2. Id. at 551. 
 3. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 31 (1999). 
 4. See United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1233 (5th Cir. 1997) (Smith, J., 
dissenting) (“Lopez is a landmark, signaling the revival of federalism as a constitutional 
principle, and it must be acknowledged as a watershed decision in the history of the 
Commerce Clause.”); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 591 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., 
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of additional decisions5 limiting national power—including United 
States v. Morrison,6 which invalidated the civil remedy provision of 
the Violence Against Women Act as supported neither by the 
Commerce Clause nor by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment7—
the only question seemed to be just how far the federalism revolution 
would go.8 Some commentators cheered the Court’s new scrutiny of 
federal power and the revival of states’ rights.9 Critics, however, 
warned that the Court was on a path to invalidating bedrock statutes 
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;10 once-reliable 
 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[Lopez] reflects a sea change . . . .”); United 
States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 525 (9th Cir. 1995) (calling Lopez a “watershed 
opinion”); Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 167, 168 (1996) (calling Lopez an “about-face”); Larry D. Kramer, 
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 130 (2001) (discussing the “revolution” in 
federalism doctrine). 
 5. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress lacked 
the power to subject nonconsenting states to suits in state court); Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that Congress could not require state officials to perform 
background checks on handgun purchasers pursuant to a federal program); Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that Congress could not abrogate 
state sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause); New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149, 175–77 (1992) (holding that the “take title” 
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 
violated the Tenth Amendment by commandeering state governments into the service of 
federal regulatory program). 
 6. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 7. Id. at 627. 
 8. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1052–54, 1057 (2001) (“In the past ten years, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has begun a systematic reappraisal of doctrines 
concerning federalism, racial equality, and civil rights that, if fully successful, will redraw 
the constitutional map as we have known it. . . . [W]e do not yet know the full contours of 
the present revolutionary situation. It could become much more radical and far ranging.”); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7 (2001) (“I have no 
doubt that when constitutional historians look back at the Rehnquist Court, they will say 
that the greatest changes in constitutional law were with regard to federalism.”); Christy 
H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United States v. 
Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 609 (2001) (“Lopez clearly 
marked a departure from the modern jurisprudential trend of recognizing a broad grant of 
power to Congress under the Commerce Clause; however, no one knew the precise extent 
of the departure.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 823 (1996) (hoping Lopez would “provide an opening for a new, well-
considered Commerce Clause analysis, that takes into account the positive value of state 
and local government, the best uses of federal power, and the ideal allocation of cases 
between the state and federal courts”); Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited 
and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 
752 (1995) (describing Lopez as “a revolutionary and long overdue revival of the doctrine 
that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers”). 
 10. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault 
on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 385 (2002) (“[F]ederal legislative 
94 N.C. L. REV. 7 (2015) 
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supporters of an activist judiciary thus called for “taking the 
Constitution away from the courts”11 and restoring power to “the 
People Themselves.”12 Yet within a short period, these hopes (on one 
side) and fears (on the other) had tempered. Commentators who 
sounded alarms after Lopez and Morrison soon concluded that the 
Rehnquist Court’s revolution (if revolution there ever was) had come 
to a halt.13 With Chief Justice Rehnquist’s death in 2005 and the 
appointment in his place of John G. Roberts, Jr.—who, at his 
confirmation hearing, downplayed the significance of Lopez and 
Morrison14 and sounded overall deferential to the political branches15 
and more nationalist16 than his former boss—the federalism 
 
protection of civil rights and liberties will no longer be tolerated by the Supreme Court 
majority.”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 
1143–44 (2002) (“[A] good deal of the present Supreme Court’s groundbreaking 
constitutional case law makes better sense when viewed . . . in terms of an anti-
antidiscrimination agenda . . . .”); Louis J. Virelli III & David S. Leibowitz, “Federalism 
Whether They Want It or Not”: The New Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of 
Federal Civil Rights Legislation After United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926, 
926 (2001) (“[T]he interpretive preferences of the Morrison Court squarely threaten 
future congressional attempts to address civil rights violations . . . .”). 
 11. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 7 
(1999). 
 12. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004). 
 13. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller: Speculations 
About Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1441 (2009) (“Even without any 
relevant change in the Court’s composition, the Federalism Revolution inaugurated by 
Lopez sputtered out.”). 
 14. At his confirmation hearing, Roberts described Lopez and Morrison as merely 
“two decisions in the more than 200-year sweep of decisions in which the Supreme Court 
has . . . recognized extremely broad authority on Congress’s part, going all the way back to 
Gibbons v. Ogden and Chief Justice John Marshall, when those Commerce Clause 
decisions were important in binding the Nation together as a single commercial unit,” and 
he observed that Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18, 22 (2005) (holding that the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution permits Congress to criminalize the production and use of 
home-grown marijuana even where approved by states for medical purposes), showed that 
Lopez and Morrison did not “junk all the cases that came before” them. Confirmation 
Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United States: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 225, 271–72 (2005). 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 158 (“I don’t think the courts should have a dominant role in 
society . . . . [T]he Court has to appreciate that the reason they have that authority [to 
strike down unconstitutional legislative or executive action] is because they’re interpreting 
the law, they’re not making policy, and to the extent they go beyond their confined limits 
and make policy or execute the law, they lose their legitimacy . . . .”). 
 16. Responding to Sen. Dianne Feinstein’s question (about Lopez), “[A]t what point 
does crime influence commerce?” Roberts stated: “I think it does . . . . [The Act] didn’t 
have a requirement that the firearm be transported in interstate commerce . . . . [If] the 
Act had required that, which I think . . . it’s fairly easy to show in almost every case . . . , 
then that would have been within the Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.” Id. 
at 349. 
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revolution became a brief episode in a quickly receding past. 
Although Chief Justice Roberts has gone on to author and join 
majority opinions invalidating federal laws,17 it is too early for an 
assessment of federalism in the Roberts Court.18 Our interest remains 
in making sense, with the benefit of twenty years (since Lopez) of 
hindsight, of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution. 
From one angle, there might seem little to say: Rehnquist’s goal 
and that of his like-minded colleagues reflected a commitment to 
limiting federal power and safeguarding the interests of state 
governments.19 But given that federalism can mean different things20 
 
 17. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (holding the coverage 
formula of Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 unconstitutional on federalism 
grounds); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 321, 356 (2010) (holding that the First 
Amendment invalidated a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
prohibiting corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for electioneering 
communications within thirty days before a primary or sixty days before a general 
election). 
 18. For some early speculation, see, for example, CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS & JOHN C. 
BLAKEMAN, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND NEW FEDERALISM: FROM THE 
REHNQUIST TO THE ROBERTS COURT 12 (2012), which notes that “it thus remains 
uncertain at best whether a . . . majority will coalesce to . . . erect new limits on federal 
authority that go beyond existing precedents”; LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, 
UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 54 (2014), which 
argues that notwithstanding Roberts’s vote in NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577, 2601 
(2012), to uphold the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act, “the Chief 
shares his right-leaning colleagues’ desire to limit the scope of federal power—and to craft 
new constitutional law in order to do so”; Jonathan H. Adler, Getting the Roberts Court 
Right: A Response to Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 983, 1012 (2008), which suggests 
that “[t]he Roberts Court . . . seems inclined to decide most cases as narrowly as possible, 
producing few seismic shifts in any direction”; and Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court 
at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947, 962 (2008), which describes the Roberts Court as 
“the most pro-business Court of any since the mid-1930s.” 
 19. For commentators describing the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions as a 
product of conservative politicking, see, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding 
the Rehnquist Court: An Admiring Reply to Professor Merrill, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659, 659 
(2003), which argues that “the reality is that the recent and current activism—as measured 
by invalidated laws and overruling precedent—is all in a conservative direction”; Bradley 
W. Joondeph, Federalism, the Rehnquist Court, and the Modern Republican Party, 87 OR. 
L. REV. 117, 168 (2008), which suggests that “[t]hough the Court’s concern for state 
autonomy may have varied by context, the broad arc of its decisions reflected the 
priorities of [the] national political coalition that empowered and sustained most of the 
Justices”; and Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon of 
Acceptable Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 122 (1998), which notes that “[t]he Justices’ 
performance . . . suggests that crude politics is at least as important as theories of 
federalism.” 
 20. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Three Federalisms, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285 
(2008) (describing three different versions of federalism as the term has evolved since the 
founding era). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 7 (2015) 
2015] FEDERALISM AS DOCKET CONTROL 13 
and serve different purposes,21 making sense of the aims and 
achievements of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions requires going 
further than simply treating them as geared to shifting the balance 
between federal and state power. Commentators have therefore 
offered sophisticated accounts of Lopez, Morrison, and other 
federalism decisions of the Rehnquist era. John McGinnis, for 
example, has explored how the Rehnquist Court’s decisions were 
geared to reviving civic engagement and other features of 
Tocquevillian America by (among other things) “restoring broad 
decision-making power to the states and localities.”22 Ernest Young, 
on the other hand, casts the five-Justice majority in Lopez and other 
Rehnquist-era federalism decisions as “aggressively protect[ing] state 
sovereignty” (contrasted with state autonomy) via hard substantive 
limits on federal power.23 At the same time, and consistent with the 
benefit of close examination, some commentators have expressed 
skepticism as to how Lopez and other cases could ever have served in 
practice to limit the reach of the federal government.24 
This Article takes a fresh look at the Rehnquist Court’s 
federalism revolution and offers a new perspective on what the Court 
was up to. We do not pretend that our account is definitive in the 
sense of offering the singularly correct understanding of all of the 
Rehnquist-era decisions (and thus we do not spend much time 
disputing other approaches). Rather, our goal is to set out a 
perspective that, we hope, will refine the understanding of these 
cases. While our analysis can usefully apply to a variety of decisions, 
 
 21. See generally Jason Mazzone, The Social Capital Argument for Federalism, 11 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 27, 27–28 (2001) (summarizing commonly offered justifications for 
federalism). 
 22. John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s 
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 485, 521 (2002). 
 23. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 23, 
33, 39 (2004). 
 24. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and 
Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (“[T]he Rehnquist Revolution 
thesis is weakened considerably by the fact that the Court has done nothing, and seems 
little inclined to do anything, to revise or even revisit its Spending Power and conditional-
spending doctrines.”); Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the 
Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719, 767 (1996) (expressing doubt that the Court “will 
be able to muster five votes to invalidate a commerce power measure when Congress does 
not commit the oversight that explains Lopez”); Joshua A. Klein, Note, Commerce Clause 
Questions After Morrison: Some Observations on the New Formalism and the New 
Realism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 571, 594 (2002) (remarking that Lopez and Morrison, despite 
the Court’s intention, “provided Congress with a roadmap for intruding into the 
traditional state concerns the Court claims to be protecting”). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 7 (2015) 
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we focus mostly on Lopez and Morrison as early landmark cases in 
the federalism revolution. 
This Article offers a practical reading of Lopez and Morrison as 
cases about docket control. In both cases, we suggest, the Court was 
concerned, at least in part, with shielding the federal district courts 
from ever-expanding criminal and civil caseloads. There have, of 
course, been many previous accounts of increased federal lawmaking, 
and in particular federal criminalization, and its impact upon the 
federal judiciary. Some commentators have even speculated in 
passing that these trends may help explain the Lopez and Morrison 
rulings.25 We provide for the first time compelling evidence of the link 
between the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions and Congress’s 
expansion of federal causes of action. This Article’s approach is also 
novel because it shows that, from the Court’s perspective, docket 
control was not simply about keeping the caseloads of the district 
courts at a manageable level. Instead, quite apart from numbers, the 
Court was concerned with the particular types of cases Congress 
wanted the district courts to handle. Congress, the Justices feared, 
was undermining the prestige of the federal judiciary by blurring the 
distinction between state and federal judges and turning federal 
judges into petty magistrates who would spend their days presiding 
over garden-variety criminal offenses and civil disputes. Docket 
control was thus about protecting both the integrity and the time of 
the third branch of government—a mechanism, in other words, that 
began in federalism but (pre)served also separation of powers. 
While we draw on a variety of sources in presenting our account, 
this Article relies heavily on a rich and surprisingly underused 
resource: the annual testimony, transcribed and in recent years 
recorded, by Supreme Court Justices before congressional 
committees in support of the Court’s annual budgetary requests.26 
 
 25. See Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: 
Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 
1641, 1646 (2002) (“Lopez and Morrison provide a doctrine with which the Supreme 
Court can prune back federal criminal jurisdiction, particularly in cases involving conduct 
the Court deems non-economic.”); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
674, 709 (1995) (“The Supreme Court . . . may have been concerned [in Lopez] about the 
dragging weight of criminal cases on the federal docket.”). 
 26. In 1939, Congress created the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and gave it 
the task of developing and executing the annual budget for the federal circuit and district 
courts (a function previously performed by the Department of Justice) but not the budget 
of the Supreme Court, which therefore handles its own annual appropriations request. See 
Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, §§ 302, 305, 308, 53 Stat. 1223–25 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 601, 605, 610 (2012)). One of the few studies of the budget process concludes, 
“Congress uses the budget as a device to signal its approval or disapproval to the Court.” 
94 N.C. L. REV. 7 (2015) 
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The Office of the Marshal of the Court oversees the preparation of 
the Court’s budget which, when approved by the Court, is submitted 
to the Office of Management and Budget for presentation to 
Congress.27 In support of the Court’s budgetary request, members of 
the Court—typically two Justices at a time—and of the Court’s 
professional staff have appeared annually for many years before the 
Appropriations Committee of the House (and with less regularity of 
the Senate) to answer questions about the submitted budget.28 Given 
that the Court has a long record of budgetary modesty29 and that 
there are almost no other occasions on which the Justices submit to 
questioning, these sessions quickly turn to matters other than those 
financial. The hearings document candid comments by the Justices on 
a range of issues, including a deep concern with Congress’s treatment 
 
Eugenia Froedge Toma, Congressional Influence and the Supreme Court: The Budget as a 
Signaling Device, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 145 (1991). 
 27. Thomas G. Walker, Budget of the Court, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 117, 117 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2005). 
 28. The earliest transcript we located of Supreme Court Justices testifying in support 
of the Court’s annual budget request is from March 3, 1943, when Justices Owen Roberts 
and Hugo L. Black appeared before the House Appropriations Committee in support of a 
budgetary request for $484,200 for 1944. See The Judiciary Appropriation Bill for 1944: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legis.-Judiciary Appropriations of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 78th Cong. 101–02 (1943). There are prior occasions on which the Justices 
testified in support of specific items. For example, in 1930, Justice Harlan F. Stone 
appeared before the House Committee in support of funding for law books for the Library 
of Congress (and by extension use of the Justices). See Legislative Establishment 
Appropriations Bill, 1931: Hearings Before Subcomm. of H. Comm. on Appropriations, 
71st Cong. 232–33, 236 (1930). 
 29. For fiscal year 2015, the Supreme Court’s budget (excluding salaries for the 
Justices) was $72,625,000. Judiciary Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 
Stat. 199, 199. Chief Justice Roberts has observed that the entire federal judiciary, with an 
annual budget of around $7 billion, “consumes only the tiniest sliver of federal revenues, 
just two-tenths of one percent of the federal government’s total outlays.” JOHN G. 
ROBERTS, JR., 2013 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3, 7 (2013), 
reprinted in STATE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Shelley L. Dowling ed., 
2014) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORTS]. For an accounting of the budgets of the Supreme 
Court and the lower federal courts beginning in fiscal year 1792, see Daniel S. Holt, 
Federal Judiciary Appropriations, 1792–2010, FED. JUD. CTR. (2012), http://www.fjc.gov
/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Appropriations.pdf/$file/Appropriations.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z2D4
-ZEGT]. Congressional committee members routinely applaud the Court’s thriftiness. See, 
e.g., Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1995: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, 
& State, the Judiciary, & Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 103d Cong. 
95 (1994) (statement of Sen. Ernest Hollings) (noting that the “budget request for the 
Court is once again very modest this year”); id. at 96 (statement of Sen. Peter Domenici) 
(“Clearly, there isn’t any question that we are operating with rather tight resources. But 
frankly, the Supreme Court’s budget would be considered a frugal one . . . .”). 
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of the lower federal courts. Indeed, read with the benefit of hindsight, 
the hearings show the Justices shortly prior to Lopez and Morrison 
forecasting the Court’s decisions in those cases—and articulating a 
rationale underlying the decisions. 
The significance of our account extends beyond a single episode 
in the history of the Supreme Court. Once cast in terms of docket 
control, Lopez and Morrison represent not a break—revolutionary or 
otherwise—but rather the culmination of a much longer history of 
overburdened (and underappreciated) federal judges pushing back 
against demands to perform tasks that would distract them from their 
core functions under the Constitution. 
More generally, apart from the federalism decisions of the 
Rehnquist Court, many cases—many landmark cases—might be 
better understood in the new light of docket control. We even offer a 
new reading of Marbury v. Madison.30 While at first blush docket 
control may seem less exciting than other accounts of Supreme Court 
decision making, the perspective we offer helps make sense of a good 
deal of what the Court does. In particular, the framework helps to 
shift attention away from individual cases and single doctrines to 
identify unifying themes across multiple areas of case law not 
typically taken up together. 
The first two parts of this Article provide historical context for 
our account of federalism as docket control in the modern period. 
Part I sets the stage with an overview of the limited jurisdiction and 
modest caseload of the federal courts during the antebellum period. 
In Part II, we take up the increases in the Supreme Court’s caseload 
in the period after the Civil War and the century of efforts by the 
Justices to persuade Congress to provide the Court with tools to allow 
it to properly manage its docket. Once the Court achieved control 
over its own docket, we show in Part III, the Justices directed their 
energies to relieving the pressures upon the lower federal courts 
whose dockets had swollen largely as a result of federal lawmaking 
that produced new kinds of criminal and civil cases. When years of 
efforts to persuade Congress to exercise legislative restraint failed, 
the Justices turned to the only remaining remedy, invoking what we 
refer to as the constitutional option: invalidating criminal and civil 
laws, in Lopez and Morrison respectively, in order to shield the lower 
federal courts from ever-growing burdens. These two cases, we 
suggest, make a good deal more sense—and in fact have stronger 
constitutional grounding—when understood not simply in terms of 
 
 30. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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federal and state legislative powers but in terms of the place of the 
third branch in the federal constitutional structure. We conclude Part 
III with a discussion of the significance and impact of Lopez and 
Morrison as docket control cases. In Part IV we extend our analysis 
beyond Lopez and Morrison to consider other cases—including 
Marbury—that can usefully be understood as reflecting concerns with 
controlling both the amount and type of work of the federal judiciary. 
I. THE EARLY DOCKETS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Prior historical commentary on Lopez and Morrison has focused 
on the original meaning of “Commerce . . . among the several 
States”31 in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.32 This Article 
begins at a different place: the historical structure and role of the 
judicial branch of the federal government. By starting here, the route 
to Lopez and Morrison proceeds along a path that brings in view 
distinct interests of federal judges to help account for those decisions. 
This Article’s path to those two seminal decisions begins in this Part 
with a discussion of the Court’s originally limited caseload under the 
Constitution and the earliest legislation that set—and constrained—
the Court’s workload. 
The Constitution provides that the “judicial Power [of the 
United States] shall extend to all Cases”33 arising under the 
Constitution and federal law, and the Constitution vests that power in 
“one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.”34 In the Judiciary Act of 
1789,35 Congress assigned the Supreme Court original jurisdiction 
closely matching the constitutional allocation,36 but it gave the Court 
only limited appellate powers. The Supreme Court lacked appellate 
authority over criminal cases heard in lower federal courts created by 
 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 32. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 41–44 (2010); Daniel 
A. Farber, The Constitution’s Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and 
the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 626–50 (1995); Donald H. Regan, How 
to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. 
Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 555–57 (1995). 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 34. Id. art. III, § 1. 
 35. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 36. See id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81 (setting out the cases in which the Court would have 
original jurisdiction). 
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the Judiciary Act,37 and could only hear appeals in civil cases where at 
least $2,000 was in controversy.38 
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act also limited the circumstances 
under which the Court could review, by writ of error, the decisions of 
state courts on federal issues.39 These circumstances included the 
power to review decisions of a state’s highest court invalidating a 
federal statute, a treaty, or an exercise of federal authority.40 The 
Court could also review state court decisions denying a title, a right, a 
privilege, or an exemption claimed by a party under the Constitution, 
a treaty, a federal statute, or a federal commission.41 In cases in which 
a state law was challenged on federal constitutional grounds, 
however, the Supreme Court could only review the state court 
decision if it rejected the constitutional claim and upheld the state 
law; there was no review if the state court accepted the constitutional 
claim and invalidated the law.42 This basic distinction in the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 between the power of review over state court decisions 
denying federal constitutional claims and those upholding them 
persisted when the Act was amended in 186743 and when it was 
reenacted in 187344 and 1911.45 Prior to 1914 the Supreme Court had 
no statutory authority to review decisions of state courts that upheld a 
federal claim against state government.46 Moreover, even when the 
Court was granted a power of review, it was subject to the Court’s 
discretion pursuant to a writ of certiorari.47 
 
 37. See id. However, the Supreme Court as well as the lower federal courts did have a 
power of habeas review for prisoners detained by the federal government. See id. § 14, 1 
Stat. at 81–82. 
 38. Id. § 22, 1 Stat. at 84. 
 39. See id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85–87 (setting out the circumstances in which the Court 
could review state court decisions). The writ of error limited the Court to reviewing 
questions of law (and not fact) and only from final judgments from the state’s highest 
court or the lower federal court. Id. §§ 21–22, 25, 1 Stat. at 83–87. 
 40. See id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85–87. 
 41. Id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85–86. But see Kevin C. Walsh, In the Beginning There Was 
None: Supreme Court Review of State Criminal Prosecutions, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1867, 1875–94 (2015) (arguing that properly understood, Section 25 authorized Supreme 
Court appellate review of state court decisions in civil but not in criminal cases). 
 42. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85–87; see also Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State 
Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1, 18–23 (2007) (describing the Court’s review of state laws 
under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as “one-way”). 
 43. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 386–87. 
 44. See Act of Dec. 1, 1873, ch. 11, § 709, 18 Stat. 1, 132. 
 45. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 475, ch. 231, § 237, 36 Stat. 1087, 1156–57. 
 46. See Act of Dec. 23, 1914, Pub. L. No. 224, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790, 790. 
 47. Id. Mandatory review, by writ of error, of state court decisions upholding a state 
law against a federal constitutional claim persisted from 1916 to 1988, while, at the same 
time, the Court had discretionary review, by writ of certiorari, of state court decisions that 
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As for the lower federal courts, the 1789 Act assigned them a 
jurisdiction that also fell short of the constitutional grant.48 In 
particular, lower federal courts had no general federal question 
jurisdiction in civil cases and were thus dependent upon Congress’s 
piecemeal allocation of cases to them.49 Other than the short-lived 
Midnight Judges Act of 1801,50 Congress did not give the lower 
federal courts authority to hear all cases arising under federal law 
until 1875.51 
The early dockets of the federal courts reflected their limited 
statutory authority in both number and substance. The Supreme 
Court, which met in New York and then Philadelphia before moving 
to the Capitol basement in 1800,52 did not hear a single case in its first 
three terms.53 Moreover, from 1801 to 1829, the Court averaged only 
 
invalidated a state law on federal grounds. Act of Sept. 6, 1916, Pub. L. No. 258, ch. 448, 
§ 2, 39 Stat. 726, 726–27; see 28 U.S.C. § 1257 Historical & Revision Notes, Amendments 
(2006) (describing changes made by the 1988 law). 
 48. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (specifying the jurisdiction 
of the federal district courts); id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79 (specifying the original jurisdiction 
of the circuit courts); id. §§ 21–22, 1 Stat. at 83–85. (specifying the appellate jurisdiction of 
the circuit courts). 
 49. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, §§ 7–8, 3 Stat. 195, 197–99 (assigning lower 
federal courts jurisdiction in cases involving enforcement of federal customs laws); Act of 
May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 124–25 (repealed 1802) (giving the lower federal 
courts jurisdiction in copyright infringement cases); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 
Stat. at 77 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)) (giving the lower federal courts jurisdiction 
to hear alien tort claims). 
 50. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802). The Act, passed by the 
Federalist Congress of 1801, conferred federal question jurisdiction on the federal circuit 
courts. See id. § 11, 2 Stat. at 92 (giving the circuit courts “cognizance” of all cases “arising 
under” the Constitution and federal laws). The new Republican Congress repealed the law 
the next year. See Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132. 
 51. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (giving the federal circuit 
courts jurisdiction over all civil cases “arising under” federal law, subject only to an 
amount-in-controversy requirement of $500). 
 52. The Court held its first two terms in New York in 1790 and then met in 
Philadelphia until 1800, when it moved with the rest of the federal government to 
Washington, D.C. Homes of the Court, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, http://supremecourthistory
.org/history-of-the-court/home-of-the-court/ [http://perma.cc/5YSQ-2LCA]. 
 53. See Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional 
Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1294 (1985) (“As a 
practical matter, the Court had no need of a reporter . . . during its first three Terms, for its 
docket was empty. Not until the Court’s August 1791 Term was its first case, West v. 
Barnes, called for argument . . . .”) (footnote omitted). Similarly, Congress cancelled both 
of the Court’s 1802 Terms and, accordingly, the Justices did not hear any cases. See The 
Marshall Court, 1801–1835, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, http://supremecourthistory.org/timeline
_court_marshall.html [http://perma.cc/L6CZ-NHTY]; see also Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, 
§ 1, 2 Stat. 156, 156 (providing for the Court to have one term annually, beginning on the 
first Monday of February each year). The Court also heard no cases in the 1811 Term, 
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twenty-eight cases with signed opinions each year.54 The Court had 
ninety-eight total cases docketed in 1810; 127 cases in 1820; 143 cases 
in 1830; 253 in 1850; and 310 cases in 1860.55 With regard to substance, 
relatively few early cases before the Court involved grand questions 
of federal constitutional law. As one example, the Supreme Court did 
not decide a single case during the 1825 Term that concerned either 
the Bill of Rights or the constitutionality of federal or state laws 
under the Commerce or Contracts Clauses.56 Of the twenty-six cases 
the Court heard that term, ten focused on questions of common law 
while the remainder considered a mix of statutory, jurisdictional, 
maritime, and other matters.57 As of 1840, the Court had found state 
laws unconstitutional in just nineteen cases.58 Between Marbury v. 
Madison,59 decided in 1803, and the Court’s 1857 decision in Scott v. 
Sandford,60 the Court did not find a single federal statute 
unconstitutional.61 
For much of this early period, the Justices spent a good portion 
of their time riding circuit. Instead of permanent circuit court judges, 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 assigned one district court judge and two 
Supreme Court Justices to each of the circuit courts, with each Justice 
travelling across a designated circuit twice annually.62 Riding circuit 
was unpopular with the Justices from the outset: after his first term, 
Justice James Iredell remarked that “no Judge can conscientiously 
undertake to ride the Southern Circuit constantly, and perform the 
other parts of his duty.”63 For understandable reasons, the members 
 
when, as a result of illness among its members, it lacked a quorum. See JEAN EDWARD 
SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 400 (1996). 
 54. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, 
DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 250 tbl.3-2 (5th ed. 2012) (listing the total number of cases 
for the period, the average of which is 27.76 cases per year). 
 55. 13 CONG. REC. 3464 (1882) (statement of Sen. David Davis). 
 56. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 302 tbl.I (1928) (reporting cases 
heard by the Court categorized by subject matter). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 193 tbl.2-16 (listing cases). 
 59. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 60. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 61. See Morton J. Horwitz, Constitutional Transplants, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 535, 541 (2009). 
 62. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75. See generally Joshua Glick, 
Comment, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1757–71 (2003) (describing the challenges of riding circuit and 
the Justices’ efforts to overhaul the circuit-riding system). 
 63. Letter from James Iredell to John Jay, William Cushing, and James Wilson (Feb. 
11, 1791), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
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of the Court frequently complained about these burdensome, 
unglamorous trips. When Justice Thomas Johnson resigned from the 
Court after a brief tenure, he cited in his resignation letter to George 
Washington the “excessively fatiguing” nature of riding circuit.64 
In 1792, every member of the Court signed a letter asking 
Congress to relieve the Justices from “the toilsome Journies through 
different climates and seasons, which [the Justices] are called upon to 
undertake.”65 One concern was the sheer ardor of lengthy trips by 
horse across miles of dirt roads: “[No] set of Judges, however robust, 
would be able to support and punctually execute such severe duties 
for any length of time.”66 A separate concern was more plainly 
institutional: “[A]ppointing the same men finally to correct in one 
capacity, the errors which they themselves may have committed in 
another, is a distinction unfriendly to impartial justice, and to that 
confidence in the supreme Court, which it is so essential to the public 
Interest should be reposed in it.”67 In other words, there was some 
question as to whether circuit riding was even consistent with the 
creation—by the Constitution—of a Supreme Court with designated 
appellate functions. 
By way of response, Congress reduced the number of Supreme 
Court Justices required on the circuit courts to one.68 Half a burden 
was a burden nonetheless, and so the Justices again communicated to 
Congress their view that, in addition to the personal physical toll, 
circuit riding was inconsistent with the sound administration of 
justice: 
It has already happened, in more than one Instance, that 
different Judges sitting at different times in the same Court but 
in similar Causes have decided in direct opposition to each 
other, and that in cases in which the parties could not . . . have 
the benefit of Writs of Error. . . . [We] therefore . . . submit . . . 
whether this Evil, naturally tending to render the Law unsettled 
 
STATES, 1789–1800, at 131–32 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) [hereinafter 2 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY]. 
 64. Letter from Thomas Johnson to George Washington (Jan. 16, 1793), in 1 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, 
at 80 (Maeva Marcus & James Perry eds., 1985) [hereinafter 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
Justice Johnson added: “I cannot resolve to spend six Months in the Year of the few I may 
have left from my Family, on Roads at Taverns chiefly and often in Situations where the 
most moderate Desires are disappointed . . . .” Id. 
 65. Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to the Congress of the United 
States (Aug. 9, 1792), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 63, at 289–90. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 90. 
 68. Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333, 333–34. 
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and uncertain, and thereby to create apprehensions and 
diffidence in the public mind, does not require the Interposition 
of Congress.69 
Despite the plea, no further relief came. 
Evidently, Congress believed circuit riding beneficial: it reduced 
the risk of the Supreme Court turning into “a centralized 
metropolitan Court.”70 Keeping the Justices on the road kept them in 
touch with “the great mass of the community”71 and guarded against a 
consolidation of power that could result from the members of the 
Court remaining together in a single location. Thus, aside from the 
short-lived Midnight Judges Act of 1801,72 circuit riding remained a 
statutory duty of the Justices until 1891.73 
This condensed history makes a simple point: for a long period of 
time, the federal judicial branch looked quite different from how it 
looks today. The federal courts, including the Supreme Court, had 
limited duties and modest caseloads, largely because Congress 
carefully defined the tasks they were compelled or authorized to 
perform. The Justices’ principal complaint was with the burdens of 
circuit riding. 
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, however, caseloads 
increased dramatically. As a result, the members of the Supreme 
Court, who saw themselves unable to fulfill their constitutionally 
assigned role, made reform a priority and turned to Congress for help. 
That history of reform efforts, the topic of Part II, set the Court on 
the path to Lopez and Morrison. 
 
 69. Letter from Justices of the Supreme Court to the Congress of the United States 
(Feb. 18, 1794), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 63, at 443–44. 
 70. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 
266–67 (1926). 
 71. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1487 (1869) (statement of Sen. Charles R. 
Buckalew). 
 72. Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 7, 2 Stat. 89, 90–91 (creating six new circuit courts 
staffed with sixteen new circuit court judges) (repealed 1802). 
 73. The Evarts Act of 1891 established intermediate courts of appeals and specified 
that the Justices were “competent to sit as judges of the circuit court of appeals within 
their respective circuits.” Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, §§ 2–3, 26 Stat. 826, 826–27. While 
under this provision some Justices continued to serve on the intermediate courts, the 
practice was abolished as a formal matter with the Judicial Code of 1911. Act of Mar. 3, 
1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167; see David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices 
Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1726 (2007) (discussing the formal 
abolishment of circuit riding). 
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II. DOCKET GROWTH AND REFORM EFFORTS 
As a result of limited assignments from Congress, the Supreme 
Court’s docket stayed at manageable levels during much of its first 
century. By 1880, however, the Court was under significant pressure. 
From 1870 to 1880 the number of cases on the Court’s docket nearly 
doubled: the Court had 636 cases on its docket in 1870 and 1,202 in 
1880.74 New cases were filed at a faster pace than the Court could 
dispose of existing docketed cases, thus creating, for the first time in 
the Court’s history, a backlog.75 However, these developments are not 
surprising. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, a period of 
economic expansion, population increase, and technological 
innovation, there was simply more federal law than ever before and 
more disputes filed in court that would eventually work their way up 
to the Supreme Court. These increased demands upon the Court 
initiated a century of efforts by the Court to reduce its workload. This 
Part traces those efforts and their impact, beginning in Section A with 
the interventions of Chief Justice Melville Fuller and continuing in 
Section B with those of Chief Justice William Howard Taft. Section C 
then considers the further rise in the Court’s workload during the 
1960s. Section D details the extensive work of Chief Justice Warren 
Burger and the Federal Judicial Center to counteract this increase 
before finally turning in Section E to the congressional grant of 
discretionary review that represents the fruits of that labor. In seeking 
relief, the Court’s principal—and highly successful—tactic was to call 
on Congress to help the Court reduce and manage its caseload. In so 
doing, the Justices formulated their concerns about the size and 
nature of the judicial docket as an issue of constitutional significance. 
That early formulation came to provide the Court with a powerful 
tool when, in the latter part of the twentieth century, the Court 
turned its attention to reducing the workload of the lower federal 
courts after help from Congress appeared unlikely. 
A. Fuller 
More than a century before Lopez, members of the Supreme 
Court actively sought ways to control the Court’s burgeoning 
caseload. As shown in this Section, the Court’s focus was on seeking 
 
 74. 13 CONG. REC. 3464 (1882) (statement of Sen. David Davis). 
 75. In 1880, the Court disposed of 369 cases and 417 new cases were filed. In 1880, the 
Court’s total docket comprised over 1,200 cases; the figure rose until 1891. See Supreme 
Court of the United States: Caseloads, 1878–2012, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov
/history/caseload.nsf/page/caseloads_Sup_Ct_totals [http://perma.cc/VG6X-9SHT]. 
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the help of Congress to cure a well-publicized problem. During the 
1880s, congressmen in both the House and the Senate introduced 
various bills to reorganize the federal judiciary to ease the caseload of 
the Supreme Court—yet each bill failed to secure the necessary 
votes.76 That chronic failure, according to Felix Frankfurter, was a 
product of “Congressional preoccupation with more popular issues, 
the inevitable drags upon legislative machinery, [and] the potent 
factor of inertia.”77 After a decade of waiting for Congress to solve 
this caseload problem, the Court embarked on a more proactive 
approach. 
In January of 1890, Chief Justice Melville Fuller hosted a dinner 
party for members of the Court and the Senate Judiciary Committee 
at which he pitched the urgent need for Congress to reduce the size of 
the Court’s docket.78 Within a few weeks of that gathering, the 
Judiciary Committee sent all then-pending legislation for Supreme 
Court relief to Fuller and formally solicited a proposal from all the 
Justices to reduce the Court’s caseload.79 In turn, the Court submitted 
a report to the Judiciary Committee advocating legislation that would 
require appellate court judges to certify questions of law warranting a 
final decision by the Supreme Court, with such certification mandated 
in the event of a circuit conflict.80 Responding to this proposal, in 
March of 1891, Congress enacted the Circuit Court of Appeals 
Act81—known popularly as the Evarts Act after New York Senator 
(and Fuller dinner guest) William Evarts. 
The Evarts Act created nine permanent circuit courts of appeals 
with power to issue final decisions in specified cases (thereby 
reducing the number of cases on the Court’s mandatory docket) and 
instituted the certification procedure the Court had advocated.82 The 
Act also gave the Court for the first time a power of certiorari, 
devised as a “fallback provision” in case the new circuit courts proved 
“careless in deciding cases or issuing certificates.”83 
 
 76. For a historical summary of the several bills that failed during this time frame, see 
Felix Frankfurter, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States—A Study in the 
Federal Judicial System, 39 HARV. L. REV. 35, 56–65 (1926). 
 77. Id. at 64. 
 78. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888–
1910, at 42–43 (Herbert A. Johnson ed., 1995). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years 
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1651–52 (2000). 
 81. Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
 82. Id. §§ 3, 5–6, 26 Stat. 826, 827–28. 
 83. Hartnett, supra note 80, at 1656. 
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While responsive to the Justices’ concerns, the Act was far from 
revolutionary. The Act retained mandatory appellate jurisdiction in 
cases involving the constitutionality of a law,84 capital cases,85 and 
fourteen designated classes of civil suits.86 It also did not alter the 
rules governing review of state court decisions, an increasingly 
significant source of cases for the Court.87 
In practice, the 1891 Act provided relief to Chief Justice Fuller 
and his colleagues with respect to new filings: while the Supreme 
Court docketed 636 new cases in the 1890 Term, by 1892 the number 
had dropped to 290.88 Particularly noteworthy is that, in the two years 
following the Evarts Act, the Court granted only two writs of 
certiorari, suggesting that the fallback provision warranted only 
limited use.89 Yet even though the Evarts Act reduced the number of 
new cases the Court was obligated to decide, it did not relieve the 
Court of its swollen backlog of cases. Prior to the Evarts Act, the 
Court’s appellate docket carried an “absurd total of 1800” cases that 
required a decision.90 In the early twentieth century, the Court still 
had a substantial caseload: 1,170 appellate cases in 1911, 1,169 
appellate cases in 1916, and 1,012 appellate cases in 1921.91 A large 
portion of these cases involved writs of error from state court 
decisions denying a federal claim.92 
The shortcomings of the Evarts Act became apparent as new 
pressures tested the Court’s limited resources. The number of 
petitions for certiorari increased steadily in the early twentieth 
century: from 270 petitions in the 1916 Term, for example, to 456 
petitions in the 1924 Term.93 Deciding those petitions proved time-
consuming as the Justices individually reviewed each case before 
taking a vote on whether to grant review.94 In addition, there were 
new sources of cases that the Court could not dodge. Ratification of 
 
 84. § 5, 26 Stat. at 827–28. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 70 tbl.2-2. 
 89. Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 383 
(1893) (“[W]hile there have been many applications to this court for writs of certiorari to 
the Circuit Court of Appeals under this provision, two only have been granted . . . .”). 
 90. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 56, at 86. 
 91. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1922, at 5 (1922). 
 92. Hartnett, supra note 80, at 1658. 
 93. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the 
United States—A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 40 HARV. L. REV. 834, 835 (1927). 
 94. Hartnett, supra note 80, at 1677. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 7 (2015) 
26 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
the Eighteenth Amendment95 and enactment of the Volstead Act in 
191996 generated an eight percent increase in federal cases,97 while 
World War I generated prosecutions for anti-war activities and placed 
a series of civil rights cases on the federal dockets.98 The Evarts Act 
therefore turned out to be only a partial remedy, leaving the Justices 
in need of long-term relief. Following Chief Justice Fuller’s death in 
1910, the Court was very much in need of someone to continue his 
work and maintain the push for reform. 
B. Taft 
The Fuller Court’s growing workload attracted the attention of 
President William Howard Taft, who, soon after he took office in 
1909, urged Congress to further reduce the scope of the Court’s 
mandatory jurisdiction.99 After Taft’s unsuccessful campaign for 
reelection, he joined the faculty of the Yale Law School where his 
views took sharper form. Asserting that “[t]he most important 
function of the [Supreme C]ourt is the construction and application of 
the constitution of the United States,” Taft recommended limiting the 
Court’s mandatory jurisdiction to “questions of constitutional 
construction,” with all other cases subject to writ of certiorari.100 
Although neither his efforts in the White House nor from Yale 
yielded fruit, Taft soon had a personal reason for staying with the 
cause. In 1921, Taft himself became Chief Justice, and in that role he 
undertook “unprecedented efforts” to scale back the Court’s 
mandatory jurisdiction.101 Befitting his prior stint in the White House, 
Taft deemed it “the prerogative and even the duty of his office [of 
Chief Justice] to take the lead in promoting judicial reform and to 
 
 95. 40 Stat. 1941 (1919). 
 96. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919). 
 97. DAVID H. BURTON, TAFT, HOLMES, AND THE 1920S COURT: AN APPRAISAL 117 
(1998). The Volstead Act was enacted shortly after ratification of the Eighteenth 
Amendment to provide legislative guidance on the upcoming prohibition of alcohol. See 
National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919). 
 98. See, e.g., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919) (upholding 
conviction of a newspaper editor for criticism of U.S. involvement in World War I); 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50 (1919) (upholding against First Amendment 
challenge conviction under Espionage Act of 1917 of defendants who distributed anti-
draft leaflets). 
 99. See, e.g., 46 CONG. REC. 25 (1910) (Second Annual Address of President William 
Howard Taft) (“No man ought to have, as a matter of right, a review of his case by the 
Supreme Court.”). 
 100. William Howard Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, 5 KY. L.J. 
3, 18 (1916). 
 101. Hartnett, supra note 80, at 1648. 
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wait neither upon legislative initiation in Congress nor upon 
professional opinion.”102 
Chief Justice Taft wasted no time in moving along reform efforts. 
Inspired by a trip to study the practices of English courts and helped 
by his colleagues (in particular Willis Van Devanter),103 Taft drafted a 
reform bill that was introduced by Congressman Joseph Walsh of 
Massachusetts in 1922.104 Appearing before the House Judiciary 
Committee in support of the bill, Taft described the job of the 
Supreme Court as “expounding and stabilizing principles of law” and 
promoting uniformity—not vindicating the rights of individual 
litigants through error correction.105 This time Congress was on board, 
passing the so-called Judges’ Bill as the Judiciary Act of 1925.106 
The Act relieved pressure on the Supreme Court by rendering a 
much greater portion of its jurisdiction subject to certiorari.107 
Specifically, with respect to the decisions of the intermediate courts of 
appeals, review by writ of error was limited to a small set of cases that 
included decisions of the circuit courts invalidating a state statute 
under federal law.108 Other decisions of the courts of appeals were 
subject to certiorari, although those courts nonetheless retained 
power to certify a case to the Supreme Court.109 The 1925 Act also 
limited appeals from the states’ highest courts to cases in which the 
state court had declared a federal law invalid or had denied a claim 
that a state law was unconstitutional.110 The remaining state court 
cases were subject to a petition for certiorari.111 Further, when 
exercising review, the Supreme Court was empowered to determine 
which questions it would actually decide rather than having to hear 
anew an entire case.112 Notably, the Act went further than Taft’s 
 
 102. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 93, at 838–39 (citations omitted). 
 103. Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 24 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Mr. Justice 
Van Devanter, . . . as is well known, was the chief draftsman of the Judiciary Act of 
1925.”). 
 104. See 62 CONG. REC. 2686, 2737 (1922); see also Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of 
Appeals and United States Supreme Court: Hearings on H.R. 10479 Before the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 3 (1922) (statement of Chief Justice William Howard Taft). 
 105. Hartnett, supra note 80, at 1664–65 (quoting Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of 
Appeals and United States Supreme Court: Hearings on H.R. 10479 Before the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 2 (1922) (statement of Chief Justice William Howard Taft)). 
 106. Act of February 13, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936; Frankfurter & Landis, 
supra note 93, at 852–53. 
 107. 43 Stat. 936. 
 108. Id. § 237, 43 Stat. at 937. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. § 237, 43 Stat. at 937–38. 
 112. Id. 
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earlier proposal to retain mandatory review in all constitutional cases: 
Taft now warned that “there could be just as many frivolous cases on 
constitutional grounds as on any other grounds,”113 and the Act did 
not require the Court to hear all constitutional questions. 
Ultimately, the 1925 Act provided the Court with significant 
relief. Even though the number of certiorari petitions continued to 
increase, the Justices had greater control over the number of cases 
they heard and decided on the merits.114 In Taft’s view, this change 
came with no cost to the system: soon after the 1925 Act, Taft 
reported that “[e]asily one-half of the certiorari petitions now 
presented have no justification at all.”115 
Two other developments served to buttress the 1925 Act. First, 
with the rise in certiorari jurisdiction, the circuit courts largely 
stopped certifying questions for review, leaving it up to the litigants to 
persuade the Court to hear their case.116 Second, in 1928 the Court, 
acting on its own, issued Rule 12 which required litigants seeking writ 
of error review to demonstrate a “substantial” federal question that 
was not settled by prior case law; the Court used Rule 12 on occasion 
to refuse to hear cases.117 
Of these two developments, the Court’s willingness to engage in 
self-help by adopting Rule 12 merits particular comment. The rule 
was a jurisdictional rule, reflecting an idea developed after the Civil 
War that some cases were so lacking in merit that they did not present 
a true case or controversy for the Court to resolve. Prior to the Civil 
War, the Court simply decided on the merits all cases that appeared 
to be properly before it.118 Indeed, there was reluctance to investigate 
too carefully the issue of jurisdiction because, as Justice John Catron 
explained, questions of jurisdiction often proved “much more difficult 
 
 113. Hartnett, supra note 80, at 1665–66 (quoting Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of 
Appeals and United States Supreme Court: Hearings on H.R. 10479 Before the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 4 (1922) (statement of Chief Justice William Howard Taft)). 
 114. In just four years, the number of petitions for certiorari jumped twenty percent: 
from 586 petitions in 1926 to 726 petitions in 1930. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 70 
tbl.2-2. 
 115. William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under the Act of 
February 13, 1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1925). 
 116. Hartnett, supra note 80, at 1710–11. 
 117. Id. at 1708. 
 118. See Crowell v. Randell, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368, 368 (1836) (“In the interpretation of 
[Section 25] of the act of 1789, it has been uniformly held, that to give this court appellate 
jurisdiction, two things should have occurred and be apparent in the record: first, that 
some one of the questions stated in the section did arise in the court below; and secondly, 
that a decision was actually made thereon by the same court in the manner required by the 
section.”). 
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to settle” than the underlying issue the case presented.119 As docket 
loads increased, however, the Court began to insist on the existence 
of a substantial federal question, as a specific jurisdictional 
requirement, for it to resolve cases on appeal.120 In this way, a court-
created common-law rule served as a modest docket control 
mechanism. 
The starting point in this regard was Millingar v. Hartupee,121 an 
1867 case involving a dispute over ownership of cotton. The 
appellant, invoking Section 25 of the Judiciary Act, sought Supreme 
Court review of a state court decision that gave title to the cotton to 
his opponent in disregard of an earlier federal district court ruling on 
the matter.122 Rather than decide the case on the merits, the Court 
dismissed it “for want of jurisdiction” on the ground that the papers 
presented only a “bare assertion”123 of jurisdiction under Section 25 
without a more particularized statement of the Court’s power to hear 
the case.124 Millingar did not, however, mark a new era in which the 
Court would henceforth scrutinize more carefully the basis for 
jurisdiction in all appeals it was asked to decide.125 Instead, on the 
notion that “[b]oth parties have the right to be heard on the 
merits,”126 the Court, for a period, continued to hear appeals even 
when the federal claim presented appeared weak.127 The Millingar 
approach looked to be an aberration.  
In 1891, the Court resurrected Millingar to dismiss a case 
involving an alleged violation of the Contracts Clause.128 The dispute 
centered on a claim by a New Orleans corporation that the legislature 
had violated its preexisting charter to supply the city with water 
 
 119. Kennedy v. Hunt’s Lessee, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 586, 590 (1849) (“[T]o ascertain how 
far, if at all, the powers of this court can be called into exercise, the facts and the laws 
bearing on them must be stated in something of detail; as in this case, in common with 
many others, it is found much more difficult to settle the question of jurisdiction, and how 
far it extends, than it would have been to decide the merits of the controversy had the 
cause been brought here by writ of error to a court of the United States.”). 
 120. See Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal 
Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds 
Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1349 (1986) (attributing Court-created restrictions to 
appellate jurisdiction “largely to the increased business given to the federal courts after 
the Civil War”). 
 121. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 258 (1867). 
 122. Id. at 259–62. 
 123. Id. at 259, 261. 
 124. Id. at 258. 
 125. Matasar & Bruch, supra note 120, at 1347–48. 
 126. Amory v. Amory, 91 U.S. 356, 357 (1875). 
 127. Matasar & Bruch, supra note 120, at 1348. 
 128. City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79, 87 (1891). 
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service.129 Determining that there was not in fact a contract created by 
the charter, the Court ruled that there thus remained only a “bare 
averment of a Federal question” and that was insufficient to invoke 
the Court’s jurisdiction to review the state court’s decision in the 
case.130 When the state later revoked the corporation’s charter for 
failing to perform as required and the case returned to the Court on 
new claims based on the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause, 
the Court again dismissed, explaining that the federal issues were “so 
clearly without color of foundation that this court is without 
jurisdiction in this case.”131 
Subsequently, the Court invoked the same logic to rid itself of 
other appeals, making clear in one such case that “[t]here must be a 
real substantive [federal] question” for an appeal to be heard.132 
Shoring up this approach at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the Court announced a substantive federal question standard that 
barred cases “explicitly foreclosed by a decision or decisions of this 
court as to leave no room for real controversy.”133 Within two 
decades, the standard was an explicit requirement: in the 1922 case of 
Zucht v. King,134 which involved a challenge to a city law requiring 
children to be vaccinated in order to attend school, the Court invoked 
its “duty to decline jurisdiction” whenever the constitutional question 
was resolved in prior decisions and thus “is not, and was not at the 
time of granting the writ, substantial in character.”135 
In light of these changes, the Court modified its own published 
rules to guide litigants who had prevailed below and sought to avoid a 
reversal at the Supreme Court. In 1878, the Court changed Rule 6 to 
provide: 
There may be united, with a motion to dismiss a writ of error 
or appeal, a motion to affirm, on the ground that, although the 
record may show that this court has jurisdiction, it is manifest 
the appeal or writ was taken for delay only, or that the question 
 
 129. Id. at 80–81. 
 130. Id. at 87. 
 131. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U.S. 336, 354 (1902). 
 132. St. Joseph & Grand Island R.R. Co. v. Steele, 167 U.S. 659, 662 (1897) (“Not 
every mere allegation of the existence of a Federal question in a controversy will suffice 
for that purpose. There must be a real substantive question, on which the case may be 
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 133. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308, 311 (1902) (citing New 
Orleans Waterworks, 185 U.S. at 352). 
 134. 260 U.S. 174 (1922). 
 135. Id. at 176. 
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on which the jurisdiction depends is so frivolous as not to need 
further argument.136 
Additional changes to the Court’s rules followed the Judges’ Bill 
of 1925, which had eliminated much of the Court’s mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction,137 and a 1928 statute abolishing the category of 
writs of error and designating all non-discretionary cases as appeals.138 
Those developments spurred the Court to strengthen the 
jurisdictional standards contained in its own published rules. Thus, in 
1928, the Court adopted Rule 12, requiring that every appellant file 
with the appeal a jurisdictional statement “particularly disclosing the 
basis on which it is contended this court has jurisdiction to review on 
appeal the judgment or decree below.”139 Likewise, appellees could 
file a statement “disclosing any matter . . . making against the 
jurisdiction asserted by the appellant.”140 At that time, Rule 12 did not 
refer to the substantial federal question requirement the Court’s cases 
had developed. However, in 1936, the Court added an additional 
paragraph to the jurisdictional statement requirement: 
The statement shall show that the nature of the case and of 
the rulings of the court was such as to bring the case within the 
jurisdictional provisions relied on, including a statement of the 
grounds upon which it is contended the questions involved are 
substantial . . . and shall cite the cases believed to sustain the 
jurisdiction.141 
With this change, it was clear that the Court “welcomed motions to 
dispose of appeals where the issues were foreclosed by prior 
decisions.”142 As Professor Entin observed, the Court’s invocation of 
its own discretionary power to dispose of cases on jurisdictional 
grounds “blurred the distinction between appeal and certiorari,”143 
 
 136. 97 U.S. vii (1878). This modification expanded to cases coming from the federal 
courts a rule that the Court had issued two years previously with respect to motions to 
dismiss writs of error to a state court. 91 U.S. vii (1876); see Hinckley v. Morton, 103 U.S. 
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 137. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936. 
 138. Act of Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, § 1, 45 Stat. 54; see also Frederick Bernays Wiener, 
The Supreme Court’s New Rules, 68 HARV. L. REV. 20, 37 (1954) (discussing the statutory 
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fused issues of jurisdiction with the merits of the case,144 and at times 
also generated confusion as to the precedential effect of the Court’s 
dispositions.145 Nonetheless, the upside was some additional measure 
of control on the part of the Court itself to manage independently the 
number and types of cases that made it to full briefing and argument. 
In terms of numbers, the 1925 Act, coupled with the Court’s own 
jurisdictional rules, proved remarkably effective. These measures 
stabilized the Court’s caseload for twenty-five years,146 allowing the 
Justices to maintain, for the first time in a long period, a docket that 
was basically current.147 During that period, the Justices sought 
Congress’s aid for relatively modest items, such as increased funding 
to print judicial opinions148 and to add administrative support.149 The 
Court’s pleas for large structural changes had subsided following what 
Justice Hugo Black would describe in 1947 as the “very valuable” 
reforms initiated by Chief Justice Taft.150 This period of relative 
stability was to be short-lived, however, as the number of federal 
cases again rose in the second half of the twentieth century. 
C. New Troubles: The Sixties 
By the 1960s, calm gave way to concern as the workload of the 
federal judiciary, and particularly of the appellate courts, surged. 
Federal criminal appeals, numbering 623 in 1960, shot up to 1,665 in 
1967; civil appeals (excluding prisoner petitions) increased from 2,322 
to 4,473 over the same period.151 Writing as the decade came to a 
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close, Professor Carrington explained that the increased appellate 
caseload was “largely” attributable to mandated changes in criminal 
law and procedure such as “the requirement that counsel and free 
transcripts be provided for indigent defendants.”152 On the civil side 
of the equation, Professor Carrington noted a four-fold increase in 
civil rights litigation from 1959 to 1967, and suggested that the 
expanded appellate docket reflected the fact that “[l]osers in civil 
rights cases tend to appeal more often.”153 Civil rights cases also 
occupied a growing proportion of the Supreme Court’s plenary 
docket, rising from twenty-seven percent (thirty-two cases out of 117) 
in 1951 to sixty-two percent (eighty cases out of 129) in 1970.154 
In order to manage its own growing docket, the Court once more 
appealed to Congress, this time asking for the ability to hire 
additional law clerks to assist the Justices.155 At the same time, the 
lower federal courts likewise sought an increase in the number of 
their clerks and other staff members to handle their own caseload 
growth.156 In 1968, Congress authorized the district courts to hire 
eighty-three of 166 requested deputy clerks while the circuit courts 
were granted fifty-five additional law clerk positions.157 But Congress 
did not at that time also give the Supreme Court additional law clerks. 
Thus from 1952 through 1968, the Court’s law clerks numbered a 
constant nineteen—two for each associate Justice and three for the 
Chief Justice.158  
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Over that same period, the Court’s caseload grew by 170%, with 
1,437 petitions for review filed in 1952159 and 3,918 petitions filed in 
1968.160 Not surprisingly, the Justices felt shortchanged. Commenting 
in 1968 on the aid directed to the lower courts, Justice Potter Stewart 
told Congress: “I am sure [the lower courts] need all that help, and 
more. But . . . our Court in that same 16-year period has had no 
additional clerical help at all.”161 Justice Stewart said that the Court 
faced “urgent need” for clerical help, without which no Justice would 
“be able to do the kind of job that the American people and their 
representatives would expect him to do” in the face of an 
“overwhelming” workload.162 
As a result of a “special favor” in the summer of 1969 from 
Congressman John Rooney to newly appointed Chief Justice Warren 
Burger, Congress eventually allocated the Court three additional law 
clerks.163 Inspired by that minor success the Justices immediately 
pressed for six more clerks—a request to which Representative 
Rooney responded that there was an “understanding we were going 
to take this in stages, three, three and three.”164 On that schedule, the 
Court had twenty-eight law clerks in 1972, at which point the Court’s 
personnel requests shifted to adding other support staff in response to 
“the increased secretarial workload resulting from the ever expanding 
caseload with the Court.”165 
The problem, however, was that while law clerks and other staff 
members could indeed provide assistance to the Justices, the task of 
resolving cases remained with the Justices themselves. So long as the 
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caseload kept increasing, adding law clerks could only ever be a 
partial solution to the burgeoning docket;166 given the sheer nature of 
the Justices’ work, adding to the corps of law clerks would inevitably 
yield diminishing returns.167 Likewise, while Congress could help the 
lower federal courts manage their dockets by creating additional 
judgeships,168 that solution was less beneficial for the Supreme Court. 
There was no interest among the Justices in increasing the number of 
Justices: asked in 1969 about expanding the size of the Court, Potter 
Stewart said: “[It] might just add to [the Court’s] problems.”169 
Further, given that all of the Justices by tradition participated in every 
case before the Court, adding new Justices would not have the same 
impact as did increasing the number of lower federal court judgeships. 
As steadily increasing filings chipped away at the protections 
once afforded by the Judiciary Act of 1925, the Court continued to 
look for new ways to keep its docket current. For a period, 
appropriated solutions remained the preferred remedy. Together with 
regular requests for a larger support staff,170 the Court asked Congress 
for technological upgrades to help the Court become more efficient.171 
In 1970, the Court requested $25,000 to study the feasibility of a 
“computer application” to assist the clerk of the Court in managing 
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filings.172 Satisfied with the results of that study, the Court followed up 
a year later by including in its budget request a “remote terminal 
computer application”—as a way, Justice Potter Stewart explained, 
“to try to plan ahead for what would otherwise be an extraordinary 
increase in the need for additional manpower.”173 Evidently, the 
computer request proved a sticking point for Congress because over 
the next three years the Court reiterated the same request with 
increased urgency.174 In a context in which Chief Justice Burger 
complained of the “deferred maintenance of the total judicial 
machinery[,]”175 the Court’s interest in technology reflected an 
optimism that, in managing the growing docket, “a long-range 
solution lies in the automation of many of the functions that are 
performed manually at present.”176 
As with law clerks, however, technological improvements could 
only achieve so much. With the Court docketing 4,412 cases in 1970, it 
was clear that appropriated solutions were far from adequate.177 
Money could not solve everything. In 1971, Justice Stewart remarked: 
“[O]ver the last 20 years [the Justices] have approached our annual 
increase in terms of patchwork and Band-Aids rather than giving any 
real thought to the very sobering problems presented by the 
projection of our greatly increasing caseload.”178 An old problem 
facing the Court demanded new and more dramatic remedies, the 
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pursuit of which fell to the newly appointed Chief Justice, Warren 
Burger, and the newly created Federal Judicial Center. 
D. Burger and the FJC: Radical Reform 
Two developments laid the groundwork for the pursuit of radical 
reform and ultimately the Supreme Court’s response to docket 
problems in Lopez and Morrison: the creation of the Federal Judicial 
Center and the appointment of Warren Burger as Chief Justice. 
Congress established the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) in 1967 
in order to “further the development and adoption of improved 
administration in the courts of the United States.”179 By statute, the 
Chief Justice serves as the Chair of the FJC’s supervisory board.180 
Initially, the FJC focused its attention on the composition and 
operations of the federal district courts, issuing modest 
recommendations for improvements.181 After Warren Burger became 
Chief Justice in the summer of 1969, the FJC assumed a more 
prominent role and pursued more comprehensive reforms. 
Burger was no wallflower. Ignoring “pressures toward a 
cloistered judiciary,” he immediately began advocating for changes to 
the overall structure of the judiciary.182 At the American Bar 
Association’s (“ABA”) annual meeting on August 10, 1970, Burger 
called on the organization to bring attention to the unmanageable 
workload of the federal courts: “The price we are now paying and will 
pay is partly because judges have been too timid and the bar has been 
too apathetic to make clear to the public and to Congress the needs of 
the courts.”183 Describing the creation of the FJC as “one of the few 
bright spots in the past 30 years,”184 Burger saw the Center as his 
partner for reshaping the federal courts. While in the short term that 
partnership generated only modest changes, it created a framework 
for more sweeping reforms in later years. 
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In the summer of 1971, the FJC convened a study group chaired 
by Professor Paul Freund to examine broadly the work of the 
Supreme Court and the federal appellate courts.185 The group’s 
resulting report (the “Freund Report”) issued a startling conclusion: 
The statistics of the Court’s current workload, both in absolute 
terms and in the mounting trend, are impressive evidence that 
the conditions essential for the performance of the Court’s 
mission do not exist. For an ordinary appellate court the 
burgeoning volume of cases would be a staggering burden; for 
the Supreme Court the pressures of the docket are 
incompatible with the appropriate fulfillment of its historic and 
essential functions.186 
In sum, the Supreme Court was no longer able to carry out the tasks 
assigned to it in the Constitution. In light of this assessment, the 
report concluded, “significant remedial measures are required 
now.”187 
The Freund Report marked a turning point. Following its 
publication, the Justices abandoned their prior focus on staffing, 
computers, and other small-scale, piecemeal administrative 
adjustments. Under Burger’s leadership, the Justices became 
energetic public advocates for structural reform. In particular, the 
Justices used budgetary hearings as a forum to air their concerns 
about the problems the judiciary faced and the need for Congress’s 
help. Year-end reports, initiated by the Chief Justice in 1970, likewise 
served as a vehicle for laying out the judiciary’s problems and for 
pressing for change.188 Consistent with the tone of the Freund Report, 
going forward, the Justices began to frame their concerns as problems 
of a clear constitutional dimension—and with that development, the 
road to Lopez and Morrison was paved. 
In many ways, Burger and the authors of the Freund Report 
were of one mind. Before the Report was published in late 1972, 
Burger had said that internal changes to Supreme Court operations 
“can be of small help in the face of the constant demand that we deal 
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with more and more cases each year.”189 Reflecting that sentiment, 
the Freund Report weighed the merits of internal reforms such as 
changing the rule of four (which requires the vote of just four Justices 
to grant a petition for certiorari) and adding law clerks.190 The former 
proposal was dismissed as “untenable” since it would likely not 
reduce the number of cases the Court had to review and, further, 
“might be viewed as an invidious effort to reduce access to the 
Court.”191 The study group also cast doubt on the benefit of adding 
law clerks not merely because additional clerks would not reduce the 
“non-delegable” workload of the Justices, but also because the 
Justices’ chambers were physically too small to accommodate a larger 
staff.192 
Looking instead to larger initiatives, the Freund Report gave 
Burger specific proposals to champion. The key structural reform 
recommended in the Freund Report was the establishment of a 
“National Court of Appeals,” comprised of seven judges drawn for 
three-year terms from the federal circuit courts, to screen all cases in 
which review by the Supreme Court was sought.193 After conducting 
its own review of cases presented, the National Court of Appeals 
would refer the most meritorious cases to the Supreme Court while 
deciding the remaining cases (including cases involving conflicts 
among the circuits) itself.194 The National Court of Appeals would 
also decide cases remanded to it by the Supreme Court.195 The 
authors of the Report predicted that the National Court of Appeals 
could itself hear about four hundred cases per year.196 Anticipating 
criticism of the proposal, the Report maintained that among the 
options, creating the National Court of Appeals and assigning it a 
screening function represented the “least problematic” method of 
providing “imperative” relief to the Supreme Court.197 
Burger seized on the proposal. Addressing the ABA, he said the 
Freund Report provided “an analysis of the problems that is not open 
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to serious challenge.”198 Although he conceded that “[r]easonable 
men can disagree over the particular kind of intermediate court 
recommended by Professor Freund’s committee and the powers of 
that court,”199 Burger insisted that “no person who looks at the facts” 
could conclude that the Supreme Court could continue to operate 
effectively without meaningful reform.200 Given the burdens the Court 
faced, Burger concluded, “it is the obligation of those who disagree 
with the solutions proposed to offer their own alternatives.”201 
Opposition to the Freund Report centered on the screening function 
the National Court of Appeals would perform. For example, 
Professor Charles L. Black deemed that function unconstitutional: “A 
court that can finally determine, for the whole nation, questions over 
the whole range of federal law, without the possibility of further 
review, is a ‘Supreme Court’ in everything but name, and the 
Constitution provides for one Supreme Court, quite as clearly as it 
provides for one President.”202 
The proposal for a new appellate court gained traction with the 
1975 report of the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court 
Appellate System, established by Congress in 1972.203 Chaired by Sen. 
Roman L. Hruska, the Commission also offered a grim assessment of 
the Supreme Court’s status: “[T]he percentage of cases accorded 
review [has] dipped below the minimum necessary for effective 
monitoring of the nation’s courts on issues of federal statutory and 
constitutional law.”204 Again, the problem was one of constitutional 
magnitude. The Commission likewise recommended the creation of a 
National Court of Appeals but under its proposal, the new court, 
staffed by seven permanent judges, would not perform the 
controversial screening function Freund’s group had recommended.205 
Instead, the new National Court of Appeals would only hear cases 
referred to it by the Supreme Court and cases transferred to it from 
the other federal courts of appeals—and the Supreme Court would 
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have power to review decisions of the National Court of Appeals 
along with decisions of other federal courts of appeals.206 
While Burger, as Chief Justice, played the leading role in 
articulating the Court’s caseload problem and pushing for reform, 
other Justices also contributed to the discussion. Justice Byron White, 
for example, was initially reluctant to make a public statement on 
these various proposals, saying in a 1974 budgetary hearing that he 
“[could not] speak to” the intermediate appellate court proposal since 
he had “not resolved the matter in [his] own mind.”207 Three years 
later, Justice White was championing reform. At the budgetary 
hearing in 1977, he urged that while the power to deny certiorari kept 
the Court current on its docket, a new national appellate court would 
“almost double the Supreme Court[’s] capacity,”208 thus allowing it to 
hear more cases in which review was warranted. 
Justice White’s newfound zeal for legislative reform entered even 
judicial opinions. In an extraordinary dissent from the denial of 
certiorari in the otherwise unremarkable 1978 case of Brown 
Transport Corp. v. Atcon, Inc.,209 Justice White, joined by Justice 
Blackmun, warned that given the Court’s capacity limits, there was 
“grave doubt” that it was “function[ing] in the manner contemplated 
by the Constitution.”210 White, too, thus framed the docket problem 
as a constitutional issue. White contended that review was plainly 
warranted in Atcon because of the existence of a circuit split on an 
issue of federal law, but for capacity reasons the Court could not take 
the case.211 The bigger issue, White wrote, was that Atcon was just one 
of many cases the Court lacked the capacity to hear. White explained 
that among the 794 petitions for certiorari the Court had denied in its 
most recent post-summer conference were dozens of cases (White 
listed them) in which review was arguably warranted because of a 
circuit split, a conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court, or an 
important question of federal law.212 The problem, White explained, 
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was that with the Court averaging 170 cases on the merits each term, 
it had reached full capacity: “[W]e are now extending plenary review 
to as many cases as we can adequately consider, decide and explain by 
full opinion.”213 With some 4,000 filings each term—up from 2,800 in 
1962—the percentage of cases the Court could hear had dropped to 
levels that in White’s view were unacceptable.214 White ended his 
dissent by pinning responsibility for the current state of affairs on 
congressional inaction: “The [Hruska] Commission recommended the 
creation of a National Court of Appeals . . . . Legislation was 
proposed to implement the Commission’s recommendations . . . [but] 
[t]he bill did not proceed beyond the hearing stage.”215 
Chief Justice Burger also issued a statement in Atcon. He 
compared the burdens the Justices faced to the circuit-riding duties 
imposed under the 1789 Judiciary Act—a burden relieved only when 
Congress created permanent intermediate appellate courts.216 
Drawing on academic studies, Burger offered several reasons why the 
caseload of the federal judiciary had increased. Among the 
explanations he cited were: “the enactment of more than 50 statutes 
by Congress since 1969 increasing the jurisdiction of federal courts”; 
“the increasing tendency [of litigants] to bypass available state and 
municipal remedies in favor of assumed swifter remedies in federal 
courts”; and “the increasing perceived need for courts to become 
‘problem solvers’ on great social and economic problems rather than 
the traditional resolvers of discrete, manageable disputes.”217 The 
suggestion was clear: at least in part, the constitutional crisis the 
Court faced was one Congress itself had created and, thus, one 
Congress was obligated to remedy.218 
Nonetheless, the members of the Court were not unanimous in 
endorsing the solution of a National Court of Appeals. Justice 
William J. Brennan in particular opposed the idea. Brennan issued a 
short statement in Atcon referencing his opinion expressed to the 
Hruska Commission that he was “completely unpersuaded” about the 
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need for a new intermediate court.219 Brennan even penned a law 
review article in which he stated that “the Supreme Court is not 
overworked.”220 Dismissing the idea that petitions of certiorari were a 
burden on the Justices, he wrote that he could identify frivolous cases 
“from a mere reading of the question presented,” citing examples 
such as, “Does a ban on drivers turning right on a red light constitute 
an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce?”221 Brennan said 
that meritorious cases were likewise easy to spot: a Justice “develops 
a ‘feel’ for such cases.”222 According to Bob Woodward and Scott 
Armstrong, Brennan viewed Burger’s repeated characterization of 
the Court as overburdened to reflect the Chief’s “intellectual 
insecurity” in the face of a stack of certiorari petitions.223 Other 
Justices offered more tempered views. Justice Rehnquist, for 
example, told the Hruska Commission he was in “general agreement 
with the composition of the national court of appeals” but that he had 
reservations about some of the details of the proposal.224 
Importantly, calls for a new appellate court centered less on the 
concern that the Supreme Court was overworked as a problem in and 
of itself and more on the resulting effect upon federal law. That is to 
say, reform was deemed necessary because of the need to keep 
federal law uniform around the country; if the Supreme Court lacked 
the capacity to perform that essential role, then a solution was 
required.225 The point bears emphasis because it helps explain why, 
for Burger and his allies, the docket issue was a constitutional issue. 
The Constitution required, they believed, consistency in federal law 
and assigned the principal role in producing that result to the 
Supreme Court. If, because of its caseload, the Court was unable to 
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perform that role—unable even to hear on the merits cases involving 
conflicting lower court decisions on federal law (or other cases that 
presented important questions)—then the Court was not performing 
its constitutionally assigned role. This understanding accounts for why 
Burger and other members of the Court saw nothing inappropriate in 
their speaking publicly about the problem the Court faced: such 
efforts were in service of the Court’s ability to carry out its 
constitutional duty. Moreover, if the problem resulted from the 
burdens of increasing federal enactments, the docket issue presented 
a potential problem of one branch of government—the legislature—
interfering with the constitutional role of another—the judiciary. At 
bottom, the problem was one of separation of powers. On this view, 
the Court was right to press Congress to provide relief—relief that, 
inasmuch as it resolved a separation of powers problem Congress had 
created, was obligatory on the part of the legislative branch. Docket 
control was, in essence, a constitutional concern.226 
Yet change was not forthcoming. A decade after the Freund 
Report, the proposal for a new National Court of Appeals looked 
dead in the water227 and the Court continued to labor under a heavy 
caseload. During the 1982 Term, the Court had 5,079 cases on its 
docket (4,201 new cases and 878 carried over from the prior term)228 
and it decided 179 cases on the merits.229 While these figures 
represented only a modest increase from the 1970s,230 a problem that 
had not significantly worsened also had not been solved. 
Alternatives to the national appellate court fared no better. In 
the early 1980s, Chief Justice Burger advocated the creation on a trial 
basis of an adjunct “intercircuit tribunal” with jurisdiction over circuit 
court conflicts.231 This proposal too generated mixed reactions. Circuit 
judges voiced opposition,232 and Justice O’Connor, speaking at a 
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budget hearing, reported that the members of the Supreme Court 
were “not of one mind” on the issue.233 
The executive branch also divided on the issue. In response to 
the United States Attorney General’s recommendation that the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) support the creation of an intercircuit 
tribunal, an Associate Counsel to the President, one John G. Roberts 
Jr., called the proposal “exceedingly ill-advised.”234 Roberts evidently 
thought the whole docket problem overblown: “While some of the 
tales of woe emanating from the Court are enough to bring tears to 
the eyes, it is true that only Supreme Court Justices and 
schoolchildren are expected to and do take the entire summer off.”235 
Roberts also viewed the Court’s docket concern from a separation of 
powers perspective, but he reached the opposite conclusion from that 
of Burger and his allies who thought the judiciary was under threat. 
Instead, Roberts thought that creation of a new intermediate court 
risked a dangerous increase in the power of the Supreme Court itself: 
“Creating a tribunal to relieve the Court of some cases—with the 
result that the Court will have the opportunity to fill the gap with new 
cases—augments the power of the judicial branch ineluctably at the 
expense of the executive branch.”236 Roberts also highlighted the risk 
that lay in the DOJ’s own proposal that the Chief Justice appoint 
members of the proposed intercircuit tribunal: “[T]he President,” 
Roberts argued, “should not willingly yield authority to appoint the 
members of what would become the Nation’s second most powerful 
court.”237 In Roberts’s view, any caseload burden was the Court’s own 
making: “The fault lies with the Justices themselves, who 
unnecessarily take too many cases and issue opinions so confusing 
that they often do not even resolve the question presented.”238 
Although Chief Justice Burger continued to push for the intercircuit 
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tribunal—announcing that the country “cannot afford to allow the 
number and importance of circuit conflicts to escalate until we have 
rules of national law with more variations than we have time 
zones”239—without the full backing of the Court and without 
enthusiasm from the political branches, Burger’s proposal had little 
chance of success. 
Amid these ultimately unsuccessful calls for significant structural 
changes to the federal courts, Chief Justice Burger, along with other 
members of the Court, offered a slew of minor reforms. In 1972, for 
example, Burger proposed that Congress prepare “court impact 
statement[s]” for “every piece of legislation creating new cases.”240 
While some inroad was made—judicial impact statements were issued 
in “an ad hoc [manner] . . . [at] the discretion of each [congressional] 
committee”241—there was little enthusiasm for a uniform practice 
given “significant technical and methodological problems” in 
predicting the actual impact of legislation.242 
Other proposals focused on limiting the jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts as a way to ease the flow of cases up to the Supreme 
Court. In particular, Chief Justice Burger long proposed new limits in 
§ 1983 prisoner civil rights cases243 (12,000 such petitions were filed in 
the U.S. district courts in 1980, for example).244 Yet Burger’s 
proposed modification to § 1983 jurisdiction also lacked the support 
of all the Justices. Justice O’Connor told the House Appropriations 
Committee in 1983 that it “[c]ould be helpful” if Congress were to 
consider “tightening up on administrative exhaustion requirements 
for § 1983 cases”245 but did not endorse further limits. Other Justices 
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Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary, & Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 
97th Cong. 66 (1981) (statement of Justice Lewis Powell). 
 245. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on State, Justice, 
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thought § 1983 reform was not even needed. Associate Justice 
Rehnquist contended that “it doesn’t take long with a lot of [§ 1983 
cases]” because most inmate petitions were simply “frivolous.”246 
Lacking a stronger push from the Court as a whole, § 1983 reforms 
did not materialize as a solution to the Court’s docket problems. 
In the end, neither the ambitious plan for a national appellate 
court nor the more modest intercircuit tribunal proposal made it 
through Congress. After Warren Burger stepped down as Chief 
Justice in 1986, his successor briefly carried the baton forward. In his 
first annual report, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who a decade earlier had 
expressed only “general agreement” with the findings of the Hruska 
Commission,247 announced: “I am convinced that the need for this 
sort of [intermediate] court is present now, and I urge Congress to 
enact appropriate legislation.”248 Yet after 1986, Rehnquist never 
again called on Congress to create any sort of intermediate court. 
Notwithstanding congressional inaction on the issue of an 
intermediate appellate court, legislative assistance of another form 
was on the horizon. 
E. Salvation: Discretionary Review 
While the Justices were divided on the wisdom of other reforms, 
they united behind one option: expanded certiorari power so as to 
give the Court complete discretionary review.249 Chief Justice Burger 
repeatedly asked Congress to allow the Court to decide which cases it 
would review from the lower federal courts and state courts and, 
comparable to the consensus that helped carry the Judiciary Act of 
1925 to fruition, all nine Justices of the Supreme Court supported this 
change. In a 1982 letter to Congress signed by each member of the 
Court, the Justices wrote: 
The present mandatory jurisdiction provisions permit litigants 
to require cases to be decided by the Supreme Court of the 
 
Commerce, the Judiciary, & Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 98th 
Cong. 676 (1983). 
 246. Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982: Hearings on H.R. 4169 Before the Subcomm. on State, 
Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary, & Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 
97th Cong. 68 (1981). 
 247. HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 204, at 408. 
 248. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1986 YEAR-END STATEMENT 5 (1986), reprinted in 
ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 29. 
 249. BURGER, supra note 227, at 6 (“All nine Justices of the Supreme Court 
consistently have supported legislation to give the Supreme Court complete discretion 
over cases it will review from state and federal courts.”). 
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United States without regard to the importance of the issue 
presented or their impact on the general public. Unfortunately, 
there is no correlation between the difficulty of the legal issues 
presented in a case and the importance of the issue to the 
general public. For this reason, the Court must often call for full 
briefing and oral argument [on] difficult issues which are of 
little significance. . . . The more time the Court must devote to 
cases of this type the less time it has to spend on the more 
important cases facing the nation. Because the volume of 
complex and difficult cases continues to grow, it is even more 
important that the Court not be burdened by having to deal 
with cases that are of significance only to the individual litigants 
but of no “wide public importance.”250 
The Justices further noted that while the Court had been able to 
dispose summarily of many mandatory appeals—without full briefing 
and oral argument—that approach created a new problem: 
“[S]ummary decisions are decisions on the merits which are binding 
on state courts and other federal courts. . . . Because they are 
summary in nature these dispositions . . . provide uncertain guidelines 
for the courts that are bound to follow them and . . . create more 
confusion than they seek to resolve.”251 Given these considerations, 
the Justices identified a single remedy to the Court’s caseload burden: 
“The only solution to the problem, and one that is consistent with the 
intent of the Judiciary Act of 1925 to give the Supreme Court 
discretion to select those cases it deems most important, is to 
eliminate or curtail the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction.”252 
In fragmented legislation Congress did, by way of response, limit 
certain direct appeals to the Court.253 But with a significant 
 
 250. Letter from Supreme Court Justices to Rep. Robert Kastenmeier (June 17, 1982), 
reprinted in Mandatory Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—Abolition of Civil 
Priorities—Jurors Rights: Hearing on H.R. 2406, 4395, & 4396 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th 
Cong. 22–23 (1982). 
 251. Id. at 23. 
 252. Id. at 23–24. 
 253. In 1974 Congress reduced direct appeals to the Supreme Court in antitrust cases. 
See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706, 1709 (1974) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 29 (2012)). Congress also eliminated the three-judge 
district courts and direct appeals in Interstate Commerce Commission cases in 1975, Act 
of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-584, sec. 1, § 1336(a), 88 Stat. 1917, 1917 (current version at 
28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2012)), as well as cases challenging the constitutionality of state or 
federal law in 1976, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281–82 (2012), repealed by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119, 1119. 
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mandatory docket remaining,254 comprehensive discretionary 
jurisdiction remained out of reach until the era of the Rehnquist 
Court. In 1988, two years after Burger’s retirement, the Supreme 
Court Case Selection Act eliminated appeals as a matter of right from 
state court decisions holding a federal statute or treaty invalid or 
upholding a state statute challenged on federal grounds.255 Going 
forward, the Court’s appellate jurisdiction was discretionary, with the 
limited exception of mandatory appellate jurisdiction to review 
injunctions issued by three-judge district court panels specified by 
Congress to hear certain civil cases.256 
Although some scholars have questioned whether the near-
complete repeal of mandatory appellate jurisdiction materially 
affected the Court’s caseload,257 the Justices themselves were 
enthusiastic about their discretionary docket. The change meant that 
whole categories of cases that once demanded a decision could be 
disposed of expeditiously.258 Appearing at an appropriations hearing 
in 1990, Justices O’Connor and Scalia lauded the benefits of the 
reform. O’Connor reported that the Court’s ability to “take a few less 
argued cases” was a “welcome change.”259 Both Justices emphasized 
that the Court was able to return to workload levels of ten years 
 
 254. The mandatory docket included: appeals from federal court decisions holding 
federal statutes unconstitutional, 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012), repealed by Act of June 27, 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 1, 102 Stat. 662, 662; decisions of state court decisions holding 
federal laws invalid or upholding state laws against a federal challenge, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) 
(2012), amended by Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, sec. 3, § 1257, 102 Stat. 662; 
appeals from the judgments of three-judge district courts under the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1970–71, 1973aa-2 (2012)); and appeals from three-judge courts under the Presidential 
Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 9011(b)(2), 85 Stat. 562, 570 
(1971) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9010(d)–11(b)(2) (2012)). 
 255. Supreme Court Case Selection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-352, §§ 2–5, 102 Stat. 662, 
662–63 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257–58, 2104 (2012)). 
 256. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1970–71, 1973; 26 U.S.C. §§ 9010–11. 
 257. See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s 
Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 758 (2001) (“The 1988 legislative changes 
thus seem to have had little or no effect on the Court’s plenary docket.”); Arthur D. 
Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 412 
(1996) (concluding that “the elimination of the mandatory jurisdiction played no more 
than a minuscule role in the shrinkage of the plenary docket in the 1990s”). 
 258. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1185–86 (1989) (discussing the potential benefits of discretionary jurisdiction in 
reviewing cases presenting Commerce Clause issues). 
 259. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations for 1991: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Dep’ts of 
Commerce, Justice, & State, the Judiciary, & Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 101st Cong. 16 (1990). 
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prior.260 In fact, the Court was doing better than that: in the 1980 
Term, 154 cases were argued before the Court, while the 1990 Term 
saw the number drop to 125.261 Even with large numbers of petitions 
arriving at the Court, curtailed mandatory jurisdiction allowed the 
Justices to avoid cases that, as Justice Scalia put it, “were not really 
worthy of our attention, but [in the past] had to be taken”262 and to 
focus on those on the discretionary docket that warranted review. 
F. Summary 
A century of lobbying ultimately gave the Supreme Court the 
tools it needed to manage its docket. As the Court’s caseload grew, 
neither funding measures nor tweaks to the Court’s jurisdiction 
proved adequate reforms. With the failure of proposals to create a 
new intermediate appellate court, the only viable option was to cede 
to the Court’s request for (near) complete power of discretionary 
review—so as to allow the Court to fulfill its duties under the 
Constitution. Once the Justices gained control of their own docket, 
their focus turned to easing the caseload of the lower federal courts. 
The next Part of this Article examines those efforts. 
III. THE PATH TO LOPEZ AND MORRISON 
After Congress expanded the Supreme Court’s powers of 
certiorari, the Justices were more or less satisfied that they could fend 
off undeserving cases and exercise adequate control over their own 
caseload.263 The number of petitions filed to the Court continued to 
increase, but the Court granted review less frequently. During the 
Court’s 1987 Term (prior to the curtailment of mandatory 
jurisdiction), 2,577 paid and 2,675 in forma pauperis petitions were 
 
 260. Id. (reporting that the Court was “closer to the level of 1980 in terms of our 
workload”); id. at 16–17 (statement of Justice Antonin Scalia) (“[G]etting back to the 
level we were around in 1980 is some accomplishment, I think.”). 
 261. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for 1993: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Dep’ts of Commerce, 
Justice, & State, the Judiciary, & Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 
102d Cong. 3 tbl.2 (1992) (summarizing the Court’s docket). 
 262. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for 1991: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Dep’ts of Commerce, 
Justice, & State, the Judiciary, & Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 
101st Cong. 18 (1990). 
 263. See, e.g., Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations for 1990: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Dep’ts of 
Commerce, Justice, & State, the Judiciary, & Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 101st Cong. 481 (1989) (statement of Justice Antonin Scalia) (reporting 
that the Court was “pretty much in control” of its docket). 
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filed with the Court. Of those, the Court reviewed 157 and twenty-
eight cases respectively, for a total of 180 merits decisions.264 In the 
1994 Term, the Court heard eighty-three of 2,515 paid petitions and 
ten of 5,574 in forma pauperis petitions, thus producing a total of 
ninety-three merits decisions.265 In sum, in just seven years the Court 
halved the number of cases decided on the merits despite a rising 
number of filed petitions. More petitions for certiorari generated, of 
course, more work at the screening stage, but the payoff came in a 
very significantly reduced merits docket. 
The story of federal dockets does not end with the Supreme 
Court’s expanded powers of discretionary review. Its ability to 
manage its own docket through enhanced powers of certiorari did 
nothing to help the lower federal courts, which continued to strain 
under an ever-expanding caseload. With their own problem resolved, 
the Justices turned their attention to the more complex question of 
relieving the workload of the entire federal judiciary. This Part traces 
those efforts—which harked back to the now-established notion that 
an overloaded docket was a constitutional problem and culminated in 
Lopez and Morrison. This Part begins in Section A by detailing the 
growth in the dockets of the lower federal courts, largely as a result of 
increased federal criminal prosecutions. Section B then discusses the 
growing federal docket in the broader context of constitutional 
structure and notions of federalism before turning to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s plan to address the docket issue in the face of 
congressional inaction in Section C. It then focuses on the Court’s 
response to the docket problem through Lopez in Section D—with a 
special note on Justice Kennedy in Section E—and Morrison in 
Section F. This Part then concludes in Section G by evaluating the 
impact of the Lopez and Morrison decisions on the dockets of the 
lower federal courts 
A. The Lower Federal Courts 
At the same time that the Supreme Court obtained the relief it 
sought in the form of discretionary review, the dockets of the lower 
federal courts swelled. The most significant source of this increase 
was the skyrocketing number of federal criminal prosecutions that 
began in the early 1980s.266 Between 1980 and 1992 the number of 
 
 264. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 82 tbl.2-6. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 
543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 45 (1996). The civil docket presented a 
more mixed pattern. For example, bankruptcy filings increased in 1991, while in that same 
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criminal cases filed in federal court grew seventy percent from 27,968 
to 47,472 cases.267 Drug prosecutions explained a significant part of 
this increase, accounting for seventeen percent of federal defendants 
in 1979 and thirty-seven percent of federal defendants by 1992.268 
Prosecutions produce convictions and convictions generate appeals. 
In 1991, fifty-six percent of the appeals on the dockets of the federal 
circuit courts involved drug-related convictions.269 
The problem was not that more individuals were violating 
preexisting federal criminal laws or that federal prosecutors were 
going after more perpetrators. Instead, Congress was aggressively 
using the Commerce Clause to enact new laws targeting drug 
offenses, along with other activities that previously had been left to 
the state criminal justice systems.270 Among other new federal 
criminal laws was the Gun-Free School Zones Act, enacted as part of 
the Federal Crime Control Act of 1990.271 Describing in a year-end 
report Congress’s penchant for “federaliz[ing] crimes already covered 
by state laws,” Chief Justice Rehnquist gave as further examples “the 
Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 
the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, and . . . arson 
provisions added to Title 18 in 1994.”272 In addition, many of the 
newly created federal criminal offenses involved complex elements, 
thus lengthening the average period of trials and otherwise consuming 
a disproportionate share of judicial resources.273 In 1988, Congress 
created the Federal Courts Study Committee to examine, among 
 
year the number of other federal civil cases dropped (in large measure as a result of the 
consolidation of asbestos litigation). See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1991 YEAR-END 
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (1991), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS, supra 
note 29. 
 267. Beale, supra note 266, at 45. 
 268. William W. Schwarzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalization of the 
Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STETSON L. REV. 651, 679 n.90 (1994). 
 269. REHNQUIST, supra note 266, at 7. 
 270. Beale, supra note 266, at 42. 
 271. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844, 
4844–45 (amending § 922 of title 18 of the United States Code by adding that “[i]t shall be 
unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual 
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone”), invalidated by United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 272. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE 1998 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY 4 (1999), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 29. 
 273. Beale, supra note 266, at 48 (“In 1970, the average length of a criminal jury trial in 
federal court was 2.5 days; it is now [in 1996] 4.4 days. Very long trials have now become 
commonplace. The number of criminal trials in the 6- to 20-day range has more than 
doubled since 1973.”). 
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other things, the caseloads of the lower federal courts.274 Reporting 
back to Congress in 1990, the committee issued a stark conclusion: 
despite aggressive measures by judges to stem their ever-growing 
caseloads, the lower federal courts faced an “impending crisis.”275 
None of this escaped the attention of the Supreme Court. 
Satisfied with their ability to manage their own docket, the Justices 
turned their attention to the lower federal courts. The Justices’ 
concern was not simply with lessening the workload of fellow 
members of the federal judiciary. Rather, the Justices acted because 
they concluded—once again—that the constitutional role of the third 
branch was under threat. Given this motivation, when efforts to 
persuade Congress to ease up on lawmaking that generated new 
federal cases (or to otherwise provide docket relief) failed, the Court 
took matters into its own hands, making use in Lopez (and later in 
Morrison) of a constitutional option to safeguard the judicial branch. 
B. Dockets and Constitutional Structure 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez came as a surprise but it 
should not have. In the years prior to the Court’s ruling, the Justices 
complained repeatedly to Congress about the burden new federal 
criminal laws were placing on the federal courts. The Justices also 
warned Congress that those burdens presented a problem of 
constitutional dimension—one that the Court itself could remedy, if 
needed, with a constitutional solution. 
In each of the four years before Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
used his year-end report to complain about increased congressional 
lawmaking that added new cases to the dockets of the federal courts. 
In his 1991 report, Rehnquist likened the federal court system to a 
“city in the arid West which is using every bit of its water resources to 
supply current needs.”276 He told Congress that it needed to 
“conserve water, not think of building new subdivisions” that would 
tax the ailing city.277 Lest the analogy be lost, he stated: “[W]e must 
give serious attention to curtailing some federal jurisdiction”—adding 
that “we cannot add jurisdiction to the federal courts without asking 
 
 274. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 102, 
102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012)). 
 275. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE 4–5 (Apr. 2, 1990). Such measures included, in the district courts, 
encouraging settlement, more regular granting of summary judgment motions, and 
reducing the number of civil jurors from twelve to six; and in the appellate courts, 
reducing the time allotted for oral argument and deciding fewer cases by full opinions. Id. 
 276. REHNQUIST, supra note 266, at 3. 
 277. Id. 
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the hard question of whether the addition is an appropriate means of 
using scarce resources.”278 Calling on Congress to exercise “self 
restraint,”279 Rehnquist advised that new federal causes of action 
“should not be made unless critical to meeting important national 
interests which cannot otherwise be satisfactorily addressed through 
non-judicial forums, alternative dispute resolution techniques, or the 
state courts.”280 As examples of ill-advised federal laws, Rehnquist 
cited two congressional bills both sponsored by then-Senator Joe 
Biden281: the Violent Crime Control Act of 1991282 and the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1990.283 
Rehnquist’s 1992 year-end report reiterated his “cautionary” 
message from the preceding year.284 Warning against a “substantial 
rejection of traditional concepts of federalism,” Rehnquist urged a 
renewed commitment to “a vision of the federal courts as distinctive 
forums of limited jurisdiction, meant to complement state courts 
rather than supplant them.”285 In his 1992 report, Rehnquist again 
cited the Violent Crime Control Act, which at that time had failed to 
make it through the House, as problematic for “vastly expanding 
federal jurisdiction over crimes involving firearms.”286 Had the bill 
been enacted, Rehnquist predicted, it “would have seriously skewed 
our traditional federalist structure—at great cost and with little 
probability of impact on the crime problem.”287 Writing in his 1994 
 
 278. Id. at 4. 
 279. Id. at 5 (“Modest curtailment of federal jurisdiction is important; equally 
important is self-restraint in adding new federal causes of action.”). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id.; see also Dan Freedman, FBI Criticizes Trend Towards “Federalizing”—Agents 
Don’t Want To Be Street Cops, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 19, 1993, at A2 (“ ‘We federalize 
everything that walks, talks and moves,’ Biden recently told reporters. However, Biden 
himself has joined the trend, authoring a bill to make it a federal crime to travel between 
states to abuse a spouse or intimate partner.”). 
 282. Violent Crime Control Act of 1991, S. 1241, 102d Cong. (1991). Rehnquist’s 
principal complaint was with the provision of the proposed statute that “would have 
provided for federal prosecution of virtually any case in which a firearm was used to 
commit a murder.” REHNQUIST, supra note 266, at 5. 
 283. Violence Against Women Act of 1990, S. 2754, 101st Cong. For a discussion of the 
1991 version of the bill, see infra Section III.F. 
 284. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1992 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY 1 (1992), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 29. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 4. 
 287. Id. Likewise, in his 1993 year-end report, Justice Rehnquist voiced the concern 
that the federal judiciary was “ill-equipped to deal with those problems [involving 
juveniles and handgun murders] and will increasingly lack the resources in this era of 
austerity.” WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1993 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY 5 (1993), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 29. 
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year-end report, shortly after Lopez was argued, Rehnquist again 
expressed “a genuine concern about the erosion of federalism, and 
the traditional division of responsibility between federal courts and 
state courts.”288 
During this pre-Lopez period, other members of the Court 
pressed similar concerns when they testified at congressional 
budgetary hearings. For example, in 1991, Justice Scalia stated that 
while “Congress doesn’t create new causes of action unthinkingly,” it 
remained the case that “there is really a limit to what the federal 
court system can bear without altering its character.”289 Rejecting 
efforts by committee members to pin the federal caseload problem on 
the increased litigiousness of the American public, Scalia said: 
“[F]actor number one [for the increased caseload] is that there’s just a 
lot more law out there, and more specifically a lot more Federal 
law.”290 Scalia’s recommendation echoed the Chief Justice’s year-end 
reports: “[I]t is a matter of self restraint.”291 Scalia followed the Chief 
Justice’s lead in 1992 as well, citing the Violent Crime Control Act 
and the Violence Against Women Act as examples of congressional 
lawmaking that unduly burdened the federal courts. He said: 
[B]oth . . . [federalize activities that] are really traditional state 
law matters. Without demeaning the importance of either of 
them as objects of criminal law, do they belong in the Federal 
courts? Is there some special reason why Federal courts have to 
handle them? There just isn’t. . . . I am afraid that Congress and 
maybe the people have come to think that if it is really an 
important matter, why, there ought to be a Federal law about it. 
If that attitude prevails, we can bid the Federal courts goodbye 
as the very special, high caliber courts that they have been. 
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They cannot handle everything in the country that is 
important.292 
Significantly, in these statements there is an emphasis on 
distinguishing the role of federal and state courts—that is to say, on 
the importance of federalism in dividing substantive responsibilities 
between the federal judiciary and its state counterpart.293 
While the Justices were of course concerned about the 
administrative impracticality of a large increase in federal cases,294 
they viewed the docket issue in terms of basic structural principles 
that went to the role of the federal judicial branch under the 
Constitution. Accordingly, their interest lay more in protecting the 
federal judicial branch than in protecting the autonomy of state 
government. Justice Scalia thus told the appropriations committee 
that Congress was threatening to turn the federal courts into “police 
courts,” thereby undermining the “elite” character of the federal 
judiciary.295 Striking a similar note, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed 
 
 292. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
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Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1994: 
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statute enacted under the Commerce Clause in six decades. It is perhaps no surprise that 
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that the federal judiciary had become “a victim of its own success.”296 
He explained that while Congress’s expansion of federal causes of 
action reflected confidence in the ability of the federal courts to 
“render a brand of justice that is both more dependable and more 
efficient than that rendered by some of the state systems,”297 the 
problem was that if the federal courts ended up with the same 
“potpourri of cases” as the state courts, the federal judiciary would 
lose its “special competence.”298 
The Justices asserted repeatedly in the budgetary hearings that 
expanding federal criminal jurisdiction risked fundamentally altering 
the quality of the federal courts. There would be, they contended, a 
change in the type of individual serving as a federal judge. Federal 
“police courts” would end up staffed by individuals competent to 
handle garden-variety criminal law but unable to preside over the 
more complex civil and criminal cases that were the specialty of the 
federal courthouse. Justice Scalia thus stated that federalization of 
offenses traditionally left to the states to prosecute would “attract a 
different group of people” to the federal bench.299 He said: “[A] 
police court judge . . . [is] not going to be able to handle the antitrust 
cases.”300 Likewise, Justice O’Connor bemoaned the “deleterious 
effect” on the composition of the federal bench that results from 
expanded federal criminal dockets.301 “[T]here seems to be no end,” 
she complained, “to new legislation that is taking very traditional 
sorts of state criminal offenses and making them Federal offenses as 
well. That is an unfortunate trend . . . .”302 As caseloads continued to 
increase, Justice Scalia argued, Congress would be required to create 
additional judgeships but, he warned, more federal judges also meant 
a lower-quality bench. “[T]here comes a point” Scalia said, “at which 
you have so many judges that the job does not attract the people that 
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it used to.”303 Adding judgeships in order to process new federal 
causes of action was, in the view of Justice Kennedy, “the way to kill a 
judicial system.”304 In sum, there was no sense that it was in the 
interests of the federal judicial branch to engage in “empire-
building”305 by expanding the number and type of matters the courts 
heard. 
The Justices also predicted a corresponding decline in the quality 
of state courts. According to Justice Souter, as more crime is made a 
federal concern, Congress both “incapacitat[es] . . . [federal] courts 
from doing what they do well now” and undermines the state courts 
because “the expectation of State responsibility evaporates.”306 
Likewise, Justice Scalia warned, “every time you load something else 
on to the Federal courts, you are reducing the quality of the Federal 
[and state] courts.”307 
The Justices’ arguments against increasing the workload of the 
federal courts coincided with renewed enthusiasm for federalism in 
the political arena. William Rehnquist was named to the Court by 
Richard Nixon, the advocate of “New Federalism,” under which 
“power, funds, and responsibility will flow from Washington to the 
states and to the people.”308 When Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 
1986, Ronald Reagan was in the White House and federalism rhetoric 
was ubiquitous.309 Federalism was thus a useful theme for the Court to 
invoke in pushing for judicial reform. 
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Yet, as illustrated by the above statements from Rehnquist and 
his colleagues, the Justices’ notion of judicial-style federalism did not 
correspond precisely with political federalism. In advocating restraint 
on the part of Congress, the Justices were not simply concerned that 
federal power would displace that once held by the states. Rather, 
there was a deep concern that the federal judiciary itself would lose 
its defining characteristics if it assumed more responsibilities 
traditionally left to state courts. The idea that a federalist-based 
division of labor protected the federal judicial branch and preserved 
its constitutional status was a defining element of the Justices’ 
approach. 
That the Justices viewed the docket issue as a constitutional one 
helps explain why they did not consider their statements to Congress 
to run afoul of principles of separation of powers. Justice Scalia told 
the House Appropriations Committee that, while there are 
“questions of prudence,” he “wouldn’t say that the doctrine of 
separation of powers would prevent the Chief Justice or, for that 
matter, any judge from issuing a statement that the courts are 
suffering.”310 For his part, Chief Justice Rehnquist thought that 
“[j]udicial comment and proposals with respect to what might loosely 
be called ‘wages, hours, and working conditions’ seem obviously 
appropriate”311 and within this category fell “a similar interest [on the 
part of judges] in not having impossible demands made on them in 
terms of caseload.”312 
Nonetheless, even as they pressed their case, the Justices also 
sought to display respect for the principle of separate governmental 
roles. Discussing sentencing guidelines at a budgetary hearing in 1991, 
Justice Scalia said: “I am not sure it would be appropriate for the 
Court to do anything except to warn you that it will increase the 
number of appeals. I think that warning was issued.”313 Likewise, on 
questions of federal criminal legislation, Scalia said that same year: “I 
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don’t think it is my job to tell you what it is important for the Federal 
Government to be involved in. But I can tell you it is affecting the 
character of the federal judicial system.”314 The Chief Justice also, at 
times, sounded a note of deference even as he assumed a prominent 
role in the debate: “Congress, of course, is the ultimate arbiter of 
these questions [about the federal balance] within constitutional 
limits, but the future shape and contours of the federal courts is surely 
a legitimate subject for judicial input to Congress.”315 Considering, as 
he did, the future of the federal judiciary to be the proper province of 
the Justices, it is no surprise that the Chief Justice would set in motion 
a plan to protect the dockets of the lower courts. 
C. Rehnquist’s Plan 
The most comprehensive—and radical—statement of what ailed 
the lower federal courts and how to cure them was the “Long Range 
Plan for the Federal Courts” issued in December of 1995 by the 
Judicial Conference of the United States.316 The year of issuance is 
significant; it is the same year that Lopez was decided. And while the 
final version of the long range plan was only released in December of 
1995, the Judicial Conference had released a substantially similar 
draft in March of that same year. Thus, the views of the Judicial 
Conference were known at the time the Court was considering the 
Lopez case. 
The 200-page final plan included ninety-three 
“recommendations” and seventy-six “implementation strategies,” all 
approved by the Judicial Conference, along with commentary 
designated as not necessarily reflective of the Judicial Conference’s 
views.317 The plan is a remarkable statement on the role of the federal 
judiciary, one that tracked very closely the views of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, the presiding officer of the Judicial Conference. 
According to the foreword, “[t]he central vision of this plan is to 
conserve the [federal] judicial branch’s core values of the rule of law, 
equal justice, judicial independence, national courts of limited 
jurisdiction, excellence, and accountability.”318 In the first chapter, 
focus lands immediately on the conjoined issues of federalism and 
dockets: 
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Planning for the federal courts . . . requires an awareness of 
their unique role in the nation’s justice system and the special 
context in which they operate. State courts exist to serve all the 
justice needs of a geographic area; their mission is relatively 
straight-forward. The federal courts, on the other hand, are 
creatures of a federal Constitution. The Constitution charges 
Congress with ensuring that the federal courts coexist with, 
supplement and only rarely supplant the role of their state 
counterparts. . . . Congress sets the courts’ budgets and the 
scope of federal jurisdiction; the executive branch determines 
the government’s prosecutorial and civil litigation strategies 
that have substantial impact on the courts’ workload. The 
judicial branch has only a limited ability to influence these 
actors.319 
It is all there: the limited role of the federal courts, their derivation of 
duties from the Federal Constitution, their vulnerability to Congress 
(and the executive branch) when it comes to their workload, and their 
limited ability—but nonetheless their ability—to protect their own 
interests. 
Moving from preliminaries, the first portion of the plan 
diagnoses the problems facing the federal courts. The plan sets out 
the ways in which “troublesome trends and developments of the last 
two decades,” and in particular, “competing views of the role of the 
federal courts vis-a-vis the state justice systems” have undermined the 
proper role of the federal courts under the Constitution320 as “special 
purpose courts, designed and equipped to adjudicate small numbers 
of disputes involving important national interests.”321 According to 
the plan, fulfilling the true mission of the federal courts requires a 
commitment to “conserving the federal courts as a distinctive judicial 
forum of limited jurisdiction in our system of federalism, leaving to 
the state courts the responsibility for adjudicating matters that, in the 
light of history and a sound division of authority, rightfully belong 
there.”322 This distinction, the plan states, between the nature and 
duties of the federal and state courts, represents “judicial federalism”: 
just as Congress exercises limited powers, “the federal courts were 
never intended to handle more than a small percentage of the nation’s 
legal disputes.”323 Instead, as a constitutional matter, “federal courts 
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were to be a distinctive judicial forum of limited jurisdiction, 
performing the tasks that state courts, for political or structural 
reasons, could not.”324 
Echoing arguments the Justices themselves had previously made 
at budgetary hearings and in other contexts, the plan reiterates the 
sentiment that the quality of the federal judiciary depended upon 
limited dockets. The theme of special competency returns, as the plan 
explains that “the federal courts have had to decide many of society’s 
most contentious and important issues . . . present[ing] a high level of 
factual, legal and administrative complexity.”325 Federal courts have 
fulfilled this role because “they have high standards of legal 
excellence, have obtained superior resources, and attract talented 
personnel.”326 In addition, federal judges have benefited from having 
“a limited enough jurisdiction so they can become sufficiently expert 
with subject matter and procedure,”327 from “the time available for 
contemplation and reasoned decision,”328 and from the overall 
“prestige of the office.”329 Again, the point had a constitutional 
dimension: “Public confidence in the federal courts is a vital 
ingredient of our constitutional system. That confidence in large part 
depends upon the courts maintaining their standards of excellence.”330 
Having framed the characteristic of the federal courts in 
constitutional terms, the plan turned to the problem of growing 
dockets. Announcing that “[h]uge burdens are now being placed on 
the federal courts,”331 the plan set out statistics demonstrating the 
extent of the increase in cases—with data beginning at 1904. With 
respect to criminal cases, the plan noted, since 1904 there had been 
overall a “relatively modest” increase of 157% in cases filed in the 
federal district courts—but that figure does not capture the reality of 
the burden of the modern criminal docket.332 According to the plan, 
the main problem was that during the prior twenty years, “the nature 
and complexity of the [criminal] caseload has changed 
dramatically.”333 Among other factors, the plan cited a sharp increase 
in drug offenses (comprising forty percent of federal cases in 1994); a 
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forty-seven percent increase since 1980 in cases involving multiple 
defendants; an increased conviction rate (requiring that judges spend 
additional time sentencing); a near doubling of the average length of 
criminal trials; and an increase (since 1980) in the number of federal 
prosecutors (by 125%) that far outpaced the increase in the number 
of judges (eighteen percent) during the same period.334 With respect 
to civil cases, the plan reported that filings in the district courts had 
increased 1,424% since 1904, with most of that growth occurring since 
1960.335 Finally, the plan reported, in the courts of appeals the number 
of cases had grown more than 3,800% since 1904.336 
Observing that “[r]ecent legislative trends suggest that federal 
caseloads will continue to grow rapidly,”337 the plan extrapolated from 
existing trends to predict dramatic increases in the dockets of the 
federal courts in ensuing years: from 283,197 cases in the district 
courts in 1995 to 364,800 in 2000 to 610,800 in 2010 and 1,060,400 in 
2020.338 Managing such a large number of cases, the plan projected, 
would require an increase in federal district judges from 649 in 1995 
to 1,430 in 2010 and to 2,410 in 2020.339 Given these numbers, the plan 
said, without preemptive reform, one of two “unfortunate 
consequences” was inevitable: “(1) an enormous, unwieldy federal 
court system that has lost its special nature; or (2) a larger system 
incapable, because of budgetary constraints, workload and shortage 
of resources, of dispensing justice swiftly, inexpensively and fairly.”340 
In order to drive home the “nightmarish”341 future the federal 
judiciary faced, the plan asked readers to imagine the following 
doomsday scenario: 
The year is 2020. Congress has continued the federalization 
trends of the eighties and nineties, and federal court caseloads 
have grown at a rapid rate. In the United States Court of 
Appeals for the 21st Circuit, Lower Tier, a recently appointed 
federal judge arrives at her chambers, planning to consult the 
latest electronic advance sheets in Fed7th in order to determine 
the applicable law of her Circuit and the upper tier court of 
appeals for her region. With nearly a thousand court of appeals 
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judges writing opinions, federal law in 2020 has become vaster 
and more incoherent than ever. 
This is only the judge’s fourth month on the job, even though 
she was nominated by the President three years earlier; the 
appointment and confirmation process has bogged down even 
more than in 1995 because of the numbers of judicial candidates 
that the Senate Judiciary Committee must consider every year. 
Her predecessor was only on the bench for a year and a half 
before resigning in protest because he felt that he was only a 
small cog in what had become a vast wheel of justice.342 
According to the plan, avoiding this dystopian future required an 
immediate return to the basic principle of “judicial federalism” in 
which “the state and federal courts together comprise an integrated 
system for the delivery of justice in the United States.”343 Under that 
system, the state courts are “the primary forums for resolving civil 
disputes and the chief tribunals for enforcing the criminal law”344 
while the federal judiciary exercises “a much more limited 
jurisdiction,”345 consistent with the “fundamental view of the nature 
of our federal system of government.”346 
The plan observed that while “the Constitution potentially 
extends federal judicial power to a wide range of ‘cases and 
controversies,’ the Framers wisely left the actual scope of lower 
federal court jurisdiction to Congress’s discretion.”347 But therein lay 
the cause of the identified disease: “Traditionally, Congress has 
refrained from disturbing the jurisdiction of state courts, allocating a 
narrower jurisdiction to the lower federal courts than the Constitution 
permits and allowing state courts to retain concurrent jurisdiction in 
numerous civil contexts.”348 The problem then was that Congress had 
departed from these past practices and in so doing was undermining 
the “distinctive role for the federal court system.”349 The trend 
required reversal: “As Congress continues to ‘federalize’ crimes 
previously prosecuted in the state courts and to create civil causes of 
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action over matters previously resolved in the state courts, the 
viability of judicial federalism is unquestionably at risk.”350 
The bulk of the plan’s recommendations aimed to cut back, in 
quite dramatic ways, on the caseloads of the federal courts. The very 
first recommendation called for “sensible limitations on federal 
criminal and civil jurisdiction.”351 Specifically, the plan said, 
“Congress should . . . conserve the federal courts as a distinctive 
judicial forum of limited jurisdiction in our system of federalism.”352 
And that could be achieved if civil and criminal jurisdiction was 
“assigned to the federal courts only to further clearly defined and 
justified national interests, leaving to the state courts the 
responsibility for adjudicating all other matters.”353 
With respect to criminal cases, the plan thus recommended a 
sharp limit to federal prosecutions: “[C]riminal activity should be 
prosecuted in a federal court only in those instances in which state 
court prosecution is not appropriate or where federal interests are 
paramount.”354 Spelling out this standard, the plan identified five 
circumstances in which federal criminal jurisdiction was appropriate: 
(1) offenses against the federal government specifically or its agents 
or against interests “unquestionably associated with a national 
government”355 or where “Congress has evinced a clear preference for 
uniform federal control”;356 (2) activities with “substantial multistate 
or international aspects”;357 (3) activities by “complex commercial or 
institutional enterprise[s] most effectively prosecuted by use of 
federal resources or expertise”;358 (4) “serious, high-level, or 
widespread state or local government corruption”;359 and (5) activities 
that “raise[] highly sensitive issues in the local community” such that 
federal prosecution is perceived to be more objective.360 This list is 
indeed extraordinary. For one thing, the set of categories is extremely 
limited; many modern federal criminal statutes would not find a place 
on the list. In addition, within the categories, there are additional 
qualifications (“substantial,” “serious,” “highly,” and so on) that must 
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be met before jurisdiction is appropriate. Consider in this regard the 
commentary that accompanies category (2). It says: 
Simply because criminal activity involves some incidental 
interstate movement does not mean that state prosecution is 
necessarily inappropriate or ineffective. Activity having some 
minor connection with and effect on interstate commerce might 
perhaps be constitutionally sufficient to permit federal 
intervention, but it should not be enough by itself to require a 
federal court forum.361 
The language seems almost tailored to the possible jurisdictional 
hook that might have saved the statute at issue in Lopez. Thus, 
requiring proof at trial that the gun possessed within the vicinity of a 
school had moved across a state line (or otherwise affected interstate 
commerce) would perhaps satisfy the Commerce Clause analysis362—
but this extra element would not render the statute consistent with 
the approach Congress should take in order to protect the 
constitutional role of the federal courts. In other words, the scope of 
Congress’s power was not the only constitutional question when it 
came to federal criminal statutes: the resulting burden upon the 
judicial branch also needed to be considered. A further point bears 
mention. Beyond advocating limits on future federal criminal 
lawmaking, the plan also urged a complete review of all existing 
federal criminal statutes—with a view to repealing those that did not 
meet the plan’s own criteria.363 
On the civil side, the plan likewise urged fundamental reforms. It 
recommended that federal jurisdiction be limited to statutes that 
“further clearly defined and justified federal interests.”364 
Accordingly, federal court jurisdiction should extend only to civil 
matters that: (1) “arise under the United States Constitution”;365 (2) 
raise issues that “cannot be dealt with satisfactorily at the state 
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level”366 and involve either “a strong need for uniformity”367 or 
“paramount federal interests”;368 (3) involve foreign relations of the 
United States; (4) involve the federal government as a party; (5) 
involve disputes between or among the states; or (6) affect substantial 
interstate or international disputes.369 Similar to the recommendation 
with respect to criminal jurisdiction, these categories are very limited 
and would push many civil cases out of federal court and into state 
forums. 
The commentary to category (2) above deserves special mention. 
It explained that the civil dockets of the federal courts had grown 
“due in large part to the tendency of Congress to create additional 
federal causes of action and to provide a federal judicial forum.”370 
The goal, then, was to cut back on this tendency. By offering a 
“strong need for uniformity” standard, the plan asked Congress “to 
be cautious in ‘federalizing’ every matter that captures the nation’s 
attention”371 and to provide for a federal forum “only when uniform 
resolution is required on an issue that has not been, and clearly 
cannot be, resolved satisfactorily at the state level.”372 Patent, 
trademark, and copyright represent areas that would “satisfy[] this 
high standard.”373 
The commentary further explains that the additional identified 
basis for federal lawmaking under that second category, the pursuit of 
“paramount federal interests,”374 was designed to ensure a federal 
forum in order to protect “certain societal values.”375 According to the 
commentary, environmental, antitrust, and civil rights laws arguably 
met this standard.376 But then follows a qualification: Congress should 
also recognize that like their federal counterparts, state judges take an 
oath to uphold the U.S. Constitution and the supremacy of federal 
law.377 Thus, absent a showing that state courts cannot satisfactorily 
deal with an issue, Congress should avoid creating a civil cause of 
action in the federal courts—and it should only create a new civil 
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cause of action if accompanied by “a concomitant reduction of federal 
jurisdiction in other areas.”378 In other words, even if Congress is 
tempted to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts in the name of 
protecting civil rights or other important federal interests, Congress 
should only do so if state courts are clearly inadequate to the task 
and, even then, only after trimming some other area of federal 
jurisdiction to make space for the new class of claims.379 This idea—
that federal courts should not do what state courts can do perfectly 
well—is a prominent theme of Rehnquist’s opinion in Morrison.380 
Other recommendations in the plan included cutting back on 
federal diversity jurisdiction;381 increased use of agency screening and 
adjudication;382 elimination of federal jurisdiction over ERISA claims 
and workplace injury claims;383 controls on the growth of the federal 
judiciary (e.g., number of judges) so as to maintain its special 
character;384 measures to reduce the burdens from pro se litigation;385 
and greater use of alternative dispute resolution.386 
The Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts is a remarkable 
document both because of its bleak assessment of the existing state of 
the federal judiciary and its vision of appropriate federal lawmaking. 
It is noteworthy, too, for the willingness of the Judicial Conference to 
engage in what Professor Resnik views as judicial “lobbying” of 
Congress.387 While in their judicial opinions, Rehnquist and other 
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place that lobbyists need to be.” Id. at 305. 
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members of the Court had written broadly about federalism as a 
constitutional and political value,388 the plan focused on a more 
specific dimension of expansive federal lawmaking: its consequent 
impact upon the judicial branch itself. Despite the intensity with 
which their arguments were made, the authors of the plan must have 
recognized that the core proposals had no chance of success; there 
was no likelihood that Congress would only legislate within the 
narrow parameters the plan described. Against that backdrop—of an 
urgent need for radical reform but no likelihood of congressional 
cooperation—the Court took up Lopez. 
D. The Constitutional Option: Lopez 
On April 26, 1995, the Supreme Court issued its 5-4 decision in 
United States v. Lopez.389 In his majority opinion invalidating the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act prohibition against “any individual 
knowingly . . . possess[ing] a firearm at a place that [he] knows . . . is a 
school zone,”390 Rehnquist observed that the law had “nothing to do 
with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly 
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 389. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court; Justices 
Kennedy and Thomas wrote concurring opinions. Id. 
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one might define those terms.”391 Reviewing the Court’s precedents to 
identify three historically recognized categories of permissible 
Commerce Clause regulation, Rehnquist found the statute to fall 
within none.392 Accepting the use of the Commerce Clause in this 
case, Rehnquist explained, would invite the federal government to 
regulate “not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead 
to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate 
commerce,”393 with the attendant risk that federal power would 
displace “criminal law enforcement or education where States 
historically have been sovereign.”394 Rehnquist dismissed the 
government’s “cost of crime” argument—that cumulative harms of 
guns in the vicinity of schools disrupted the learning environment, 
made citizens less productive, and thus ultimately harmed the 
national economy.395 For one thing, Rehnquist observed, Congress’s 
failure to develop a solid factual record rendered the causal chain 
speculative.396 In order to accept the government’s reasoning, the 
Justices would need to “pile inference upon inference in a manner 
that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by 
the States.”397 
In his year-end report for 1995, Chief Justice Rehnquist focused 
on how that year’s budgetary standoff between President Clinton and 
the Republican-controlled Congress could affect the federal 
judiciary’s operations.398 As in prior reports, Rehnquist made no 
mention of decided or pending cases. Yet at the end of the report, he 
had this to say: 
No one doubts that it is Congress, and not the judiciary, which 
makes laws. No one doubts that it is the judiciary, and not 
Congress, which decides cases. But in the great gray area 
between these core functions, there must be give and take in 
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order to work out common sense solutions to recognized 
problems.399 
The statement echoed the themes that Rehnquist had pressed in prior 
year-end reports and those that his colleagues had made to Congress 
during budgetary hearings. Now, however, coming as it did after 
Lopez, the message took on a new meaning. Yes, there would be 
deference to Congress. But there was also a role for the Court: 
Congress, at times, would have to—and could be made to—give. 
After years of asking Congress to exercise self-restraint, Lopez had 
shown the Court’s ability and willingness to confront the docket issue 
itself. 
Rehnquist’s opinion in Lopez made no mention of the burden 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act (and other new federal criminal 
laws) placed on the federal judiciary. That, however, is not surprising. 
The court of appeals’ ruling that the Supreme Court was reviewing 
had struck down the statute as beyond the scope of the Commerce 
Clause400 and the question presented in the case was “whether the 
Commerce Clause . . . empowered Congress to enact”401 the law. The 
Lopez opinion thus naturally was one of the extent of and limits to 
federal legislative power—what Rehnquist called “first 
principles”402—rather than the impact upon the operations and status 
of the federal courts. By the time Lopez was decided, Rehnquist and 
his colleagues had repeatedly criticized the Violent Crime Control 
Act on docket control grounds. That those criticisms were not 
repeated in the Court’s Lopez opinion does not mean the concern 
had lost its urgency. Rather, the doctrinal tools of federalism resolved 
the case in a way that addressed a concern the Justices plainly held 
and had articulated repeatedly in other settings.403 
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E. A Note on Justice Kennedy 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lopez stands out in 
light of his appropriations committee testimony leading up to the 
decision. In March of 1994, before the Court had granted review in 
Lopez,404 Kennedy appeared before the appropriations committees of 
the House and the Senate to testify in support of the Court’s budget 
request. Although in his testimony Kennedy discussed the problem of 
increased federal lawmaking upon the work of the courts, he 
downplayed any role for the Supreme Court in policing the scope of 
federal legislative initiatives. Asked whether he saw an end to the 
federalization of local crimes, he told the House Appropriations 
Committee: “Not at all. In fact, just the opposite. We see a steady 
upward progress. As you and the Committee well know, we are not in 
a position to control our workload.”405 Testifying before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, Kennedy said, “Federal judges cannot 
referee the boundaries of federalism. It is for you to decide at your 
discretion and your political power how far you wish to extend the 
power of the Federal Government.”406 In sum, prior to Lopez, 
Kennedy’s articulated position was that the Court could not itself stop 
the rising tide of federal cases. 
On March 8, 1995, a few weeks before the Lopez decision was 
announced (at which time the Justices surely knew how the case 
would come out), Kennedy again appeared before the House 
Appropriations Committee. This time around, he sounded a subtly 
different note. Kennedy identified a stronger role for the Court in 
general on issues of judicial workload. He said that “the traditions, 
the constraints, the separation of powers compel us to remain on the 
sidelines most of the time” and that “we would prefer to have our 
viewpoint understood and considered by the Congress rather than 
going to the public directly.”407 As for federalism, Kennedy said, 
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maintenance of the boundaries between the national government and 
the states was not “automatic,” and the task of respecting the proper 
balance “primarily remains with the Congress.”408 He also warned 
that if Congress continued to create a “substantial amount of Federal 
crimes, [it] may affect the historic role of the Federal courts.”409 To 
close listeners, these nuances—“most of the time[,]” “we would 
prefer[,]” “primarily” with Congress—combined with the invocation 
of the historic role of the federal courts, signaled what the Court was 
about to do in Lopez. 
The shift in tone on the part of Justice Kennedy suggests two 
possibilities. One is that during the period in which Lopez was 
pending, Kennedy changed his own view about the appropriateness of 
the Court putting a brake on congressional lawmaking. The other is 
that Kennedy’s own view did not change and that in his testimony he 
was simply describing, as a factual matter, the Court’s overall 
willingness to intervene to limit congressional power. In 1994, the 
Court was not in the business of striking down laws as beyond the 
scope of the Commerce Clause, but by March of 1995 the votes in 
Lopez had been cast. In either case, Kennedy’s message to Congress 
on the eve of Lopez was new. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lopez tracked the committee 
testimony he gave in the weeks before the Court’s decision. Kennedy 
began his opinion by stating that the checkered history of the Court’s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence “counsels great restraint”410 when 
the judicial branch reviews congressional uses of the Commerce 
Clause power and the need for such restraint gave him “some pause” 
about Rehnquist’s approach.411 In particular, Kennedy recalled that 
earlier efforts by the Court to use dichotomies—such as between 
commerce and manufacturing or between direct and indirect effects 
on interstate commerce—to limit the scope of federal power had 
proven unworkable.412 In addition, Kennedy identified a guiding 
lesson about the proper role of the Court in policing legislation under 
the Commerce Clause: 
[T]he Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole 
have an immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point. Stare decisis 
operates with great force in counseling us not to call in question 
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the essential principles now in place respecting the 
congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial 
nature. That fundamental restraint on our power forecloses us 
from reverting to an understanding of commerce that would 
serve only an 18th-century economy, dependent then upon 
production and trading practices that had changed but little 
over the preceding centuries; it also mandates against returning 
to the time when congressional authority to regulate undoubted 
commercial activities was limited by a judicial determination 
that those matters had an insufficient connection to an 
interstate system.413 
So far, then, Kennedy’s opinion reflected his earlier-announced 
approach of little or no role for the Court in setting boundaries. A 
few lines later though, the message shifted. Kennedy wrote: 
It does not follow, however, that in every instance the Court 
lacks the authority and responsibility to review congressional 
attempts to alter the federal balance. This case requires us to 
consider our place in the design of the Government and to 
appreciate the significance of federalism in the whole structure 
of the Constitution.414 
In particular, Kennedy identified a role for the Court to correct a 
failure on the part of Congress itself to respect federalism boundaries. 
At his committee testimony, Kennedy had said that Congress had a 
special responsibility to protect the federalism balance. Now, 
however, came acknowledgment that Congress might not fulfill that 
responsibility: “[I]t would be mistaken and mischievous for the 
political branches to forget that the sworn obligation to preserve and 
protect the Constitution in maintaining the federal balance is their 
own in the first and primary instance.”415 The risk of that happening, 
Kennedy explained, reflected the “absence of structural mechanisms 
to require those [political] officials to undertake this principled task, 
and the momentary political convenience often attendant upon their 
failure to do so.”416 Thus the Court (which, recall, has an “immense 
stake” in the federalism balance) became constitutionally obligated to 
intervene: “[T]he federal balance is too essential a part of our 
constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom 
for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of 
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Government has tipped the scales too far.”417 In this case, given that 
the statute had no nexus to commerce and that education was a 
traditional area of state regulation, “we have a particular duty to 
ensure that the federal-state balance is not destroyed.”418 Shoring up 
the case for intervention, Kennedy noted that forty states already 
provided for prosecution—in state court—of possession of firearms in 
the vicinity of schools.419 
Kennedy’s opinion is significant because it reflects the 
culmination of efforts on the part of the Justices to persuade Congress 
to act with restraint in enacting federal criminal laws that required 
adjudication in the federal courts. Kennedy’s basic message was that 
despite repeated admonitions from the Justices, in committee 
hearings and elsewhere, members of Congress had failed to take 
seriously their duty to preserve the federalism balance. Given that 
failure, the Court itself had a constitutional obligation to keep 
Congress in check in order to preserve not just the division of 
legislative authority, but also the division of judicial power between 
the federal courts and the courts of the states. While Lopez involved 
only a criminal statute, within a short period the Court in Morrison 
would extend its approach to civil laws that likewise presented 
federalism and docket concerns. 
F. From Lopez to Morrison 
The first Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”), introduced 
in 1990 by then-Senator Joe Biden, never made it through 
Congress,420 but the legislation was ultimately enacted as part of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.421 From 
the outset, the resurrected bill’s civil remedy, which permitted victims 
of gender-motivated violence to sue their alleged attackers for 
monetary damages in federal (or state) court,422 proved a sticking 
point with the Senate Judiciary Committee. At the insistence of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States—chaired by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist—the civil remedy provision was removed from the 
Senate’s version of the bill; in response, the Judicial Conference 
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withdrew its objections to the bill but nonetheless refused to endorse 
it.423 However, the House version of the bill still contained a civil 
remedy and at reconciliation the joint committee agreed to include 
the disputed provision.424 The bill that ultimately passed both houses 
of Congress and was signed into law by President Clinton on 
September 13, 1994 thus included a civil remedy provision.425 
The Justices had an eye on VAWA long before they heard in 
Morrison the constitutional challenge to the law’s civil remedy 
provision. In 1992, Chief Justice Rehnquist used his year-end report 
to call attention to the opposition of the Judicial Conference to key 
provisions of the (first) Violence Against Women Act, which was 
then pending in Congress. Rehnquist complained that the proposed 
bill featured a definition of criminal conduct that was “so open-
ended,”426 and a private right to action that was “so sweeping,”427 that 
the result would be “a whole host of domestic relations disputes”428 
ending up in federal court.429 Rehnquist thus urged Congress “to 
consider carefully these concerns, which are shared across the 
spectrum of the nation’s federal and state judiciary.”430 A year later 
(with Lopez still to come down), Rehnquist again invoked the link 
between federalism and the status of the federal judiciary to criticize 
VAWA as a threat to the “separateness but interdependence”431 of 
the three branches of government. Rehnquist anticipated that if it had 
passed as written, “[VAWA’s] proposed [civil] remedy would have 
seriously encumbered the federal courts . . . [and] impacted adversely 
on federalism values.”432 
More broadly, after the Court’s decision in Lopez, the Justices 
continued to press their concern over the dockets of the lower federal 
courts. The effect of increased congressional lawmaking was now fully 
felt: 1997 saw the “largest federal criminal caseload in 60 years.”433 
Appearing before an appropriations committee in 1997, Justice 
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Kennedy urged respect for traditional federalism values and lectured 
committee members that the framers of the Constitution “devised the 
federal system not just as a workload division, but in order to 
preserve the freedom of the citizens, so that the citizen can have a 
very direct contact with his or her government. That’s the meaning of 
federalism.”434 Kennedy took care to remind the appropriations 
committee of the Court’s constitutional weapon should this message 
be ignored: “We have, in some of our recent cases, indicated that 
Congress must be very careful with reference to the federal 
balance.”435 That said, Kennedy also expressed hope, as he had in his 
concurring opinion in Lopez,436 that the judicial branch would not be 
required to get involved. He told the committee in 1998 that there are 
“few constraints” that the Court can impose to “police . . . [the 
federalism] balance”;437 the issue, he said, is “almost completely 
committed to the political branch. [Congress] determine[s] what the 
Federal balance is.”438 
For his part, Chief Justice Rehnquist continued to urge 
legislative restraint in his year-end reports. In 1998, Rehnquist wrote: 
“While there certainly are areas in criminal law in which the federal 
government must act, the vast majority of localized criminal cases 
should be decided in the state courts which are equipped for such 
matters.”439 The Chief Justice declared this to be a firm “principle” 
that was “enunciated by Abraham Lincoln in the 19th century, and 
Dwight Eisenhower in the 20th century.”440 Repeating a standard 
message, he wrote that “matters that can be handled adequately by 
the states should be left to them; matters that cannot be so handled 
should be undertaken by the federal government.”441 Echoing the 
specific recommendations of the Judicial Conference’s Long Range 
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Plan,442 Rehnquist urged Congress to hold hearings in order to set 
standards for when activities should be made federal offenses.443 
After Lopez, the Court’s May 15, 2000 decision in Morrison was 
not surprising.444 Writing for the Court, Rehnquist held that VAWA’s 
civil remedy exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause and that the provision was also not supported by Congress’s 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.445 On the 
Commerce Clause issue, in contrast to the situation in Lopez, 
Congress had done its homework, generating a vast record of the 
economic impact of violent acts against women.446 No matter. For in 
Rehnquist’s view, in generating this record, Congress had seemingly 
missed the whole point of Lopez: the congressional findings in 
support of the civil remedy were, Rehnquist explained, “substantially 
weakened by the fact that they rely so heavily on a method of [causal] 
reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable” in Lopez.447 
As in Lopez, Rehnquist emphasized the risk that upholding the civil 
remedy provision would invite Congress to legislate in the area of 
“family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the 
aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national 
economy is undoubtedly significant.”448 Congress’s Section 5 power 
also did not support VAWA’s civil remedy because that remedy was 
directed at alleged private perpetrators of violence rather than state 
government, the target of the Fourteenth Amendment.449 Dismissing 
the argument that a federal cause of action was justified because state 
judicial systems were biased against victims of gender-based 
violence,450 Rehnquist concluded that “under our federal system” a 
civil remedy scheme was the province of state government.451 
Like Lopez, Morrison was a 5-4 decision. While commentary on 
Lopez and Morrison typically portrays a sharply divided Court,452 the 
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budgetary hearings present a more nuanced picture. In testifying on 
the Court’s budget, Justice Souter—who dissented in Lopez453 and 
authored the principal dissent in Morrison454—told Congress he 
shared the concerns of his colleagues with the increasing number of 
federal statutes and the resulting burden upon the lower federal 
courts.455 At an appropriations hearing in 1999, Souter described his 
“basic conceptualization” of federalism and the courts as follows: 
“[W]hat the State courts and the State judicial systems can do they 
ought to do, and what the Federal courts and the Federal judicial 
system ought to do are those that the States cannot.”456 Souter’s 
theory is virtually identical to that which Rehnquist articulated on 
multiple occasions. Likewise, when testifying in March of 2000, 
Souter again echoed Rehnquist’s views on the increasing 
federalization of crime: “[A]s a general proposition, I think that is a 
very unsound way to run a Federal union.”457 Where Souter differed 
from Rehnquist was his degree of deference to Congress—and the 
role of the Court. In explaining his view of the scope of federal 
legislative power, Souter told the congressional committee: 
The criterion ought to be, basically, is Federal prosecution 
needed because State prosecution for any number of reasons, 
including perhaps the interstate character of the activity, going 
to prove itself ineffective. If the Congress will ask that question, 
and abide by the answers to that question, I am not going to 
worry where this goes. But I do worry about indiscriminate 
federalization.458 
Souter voted to uphold both the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
and VAWA’s civil remedy as proper uses of congressional power.459 
But once read in light of his congressional committee testimony, 
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Souter’s dissenting opinions in Lopez and in Morrison place him 
closer to the majority—and in particular closer to Justice Kennedy—
than is conventionally thought. Souter’s position was not that 
federalism did not constrain Congress nor was it that there was no 
role for the Court in policing limits on congressional power. Rather, 
in his judgment, a greater degree of deference was owed to 
congressional judgment when Congress invoked interstate commerce 
as a basis for lawmaking than the majority in Lopez and in Morrison 
had given. In Lopez, Souter explained at the outset of his opinion: 
In reviewing congressional legislation under the Commerce 
Clause, we defer to what is often a merely implicit 
congressional judgment that its regulation addresses a subject 
substantially affecting interstate commerce “if there is any 
rational basis for such a finding.” If that congressional 
determination is within the realm of reason, “the only 
remaining question for judicial inquiry is whether ‘the means 
chosen by Congress are reasonably adapted to the end 
permitted by the Constitution.’ ”460 
The practice of deferring to rationally based legislative 
judgments “is a paradigm of judicial restraint.” In judicial 
review under the Commerce Clause, it reflects our respect for 
the institutional competence of the Congress . . . .461 
Likewise, in Morrison, Souter wrote: 
Congress has the power to legislate with regard to activity that, 
in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce. The fact of such a substantial effect is not an issue 
for the courts in the first instance, but for the Congress, whose 
institutional capacity for gathering evidence and taking 
testimony far exceeds ours. By passing legislation, Congress 
indicates its conclusion, whether explicitly or not, that facts 
support its exercise of the commerce power. The business of the 
courts is to review the congressional assessment, not for 
soundness but simply for the rationality of concluding that a 
jurisdictional basis exists in fact.462 
 
 460. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 603 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 
Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)). 
 461. Id. at 604 (citations omitted) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 
307, 314 (1993)). 
 462. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
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It was not, then, federalism that set Souter apart from the five Justices 
in the majority in Lopez and Morrison but—to return to our basic 
theme—separation of powers: just as Congress needed to respect the 
constitutional role of the judicial branch, the Court needed to 
recognize that Congress is in a better position than is the Court to 
assess the impact of regulated activities upon interstate commerce. 
G. Aftermath 
The explanatory power of our account does not depend upon 
whether the Supreme Court actually obtained relief for the lower 
federal courts—in the form of fewer federal prosecutions, decreased 
federal lawmaking, or repeals of burdensome statutes. Nonetheless, 
developments after Lopez and Morrison merit some attention. Two 
questions suggest themselves: First, what happened to the dockets of 
the federal courts after Lopez and Morrison? Second, did Congress 
exercise the restraint that Rehnquist and his colleagues had urged and 
slow down the pace of federalization? We consider these questions in 
turn, and then offer a wider view of the influence of Lopez and 
Morrison. 
Looking at raw numbers, Lopez plainly did not lead to a 
reduction in the overall criminal caseloads of the federal courts. In 
1992, there were 48,366 new federal criminal cases filed in federal 
district court.463 That number dropped slightly in 1993 (to 46,786 new 
cases)464 and dropped again in 1994 (to 45,484 new cases),465 before 
regaining some lost ground in 1995 (45,788 new cases),466 the year of 
Lopez. Since then, the number of federal criminal cases has increased 
quite sharply. In 1998, there were 57,691 new criminal cases filed in 
federal district court, representing a twenty-six percent increase over 
just three years after the Lopez decision.467 The numbers have 
continued to climb: in 2014, 66,193 new federal criminal cases were 
filed,468 increasing the criminal docket forty-five percent since Lopez. 
 
 463. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 12 
(1992). 
 464. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 12 (1997), http://www
.uscourts.gov/file/document/judicial-business-1997 [http://perma.cc/2EP7-Q6FQ]. 
 465. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 16 (1998), http://www
.uscourts.gov/file/document/judicial-business-1998 [http://perma.cc/2LCK-MAJ2]. 
 466. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl.5.1 
(2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/13310/download [http://perma.cc/32BZ-4MRB]. 
 467. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 464, at 16. 
 468. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
STATISTICS 192 tbl.D (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/12392/download [http://perma.cc
/3Y5J-8MC7]. 
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Much of this growth resulted from increased numbers of drug and 
immigration prosecutions.469 Lopez did not, therefore, directly 
produce a drop in criminal cases. On the other hand, it remains 
possible that without Lopez, the increases in the criminal dockets of 
the federal courts would have been even higher. 
With respect to weapons-related offenses specifically, the 
relevant figures also do not point to any dramatic impact of the Lopez 
decision. In 1994 there were three cases filed under the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990 (the statute at issue in Lopez).470 In 1995, 
seven new cases were filed under the statute in the months prior to 
invalidation of the law (in April of that year).471 In response to Lopez, 
in September of 1996 Congress reenacted the invalidated statute with 
a new Commerce Clause hook that constrained the law’s application 
to any firearm “that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate 
or foreign commerce.”472 Prosecutors wasted no time in putting the 
revised statute to use: by the close of 1996, forty-two cases had been 
filed in federal district court.473 Since then, the number of new cases 
filed annually has varied from year to year but has remained quite 
low. The number of prosecutions under the revised statute hit its 
historical peak of eighty-two new cases in 1999—the year of the 
shooting at Columbine High School.474 In 2009, by contrast, there 
were just fourteen new cases under the revised statutory provision; in 
2012, the number was thirty-five.475 Broadening the focus to include 
all firearms prosecutions in federal court shows a slight drop in 
prosecutions immediately after Lopez. In 1994 there were 3,112 new 
 
 469. Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of 
Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 21 (2012) (“If we compare the number of federal criminal 
prosecutions in 1980 . . . to the number in 2011 . . . immigration and drug prosecutions . . . 
account for nearly . . . 83% of the increase.”). 
 470. Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs
.gov/fjsrc/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (under “U.S. Criminal Code: Choose a Statistic,” 
select “Number of defendants in cases filed”; then select the correct “year” from the 
column; then choose “Select by chapter and section within U.S.C. Title 18”; then select 
“chapter 44-Firearms”; select as many of the following as available: “18 922 Q[,]” “18 922 
Q1[,]” and “18 922 Q1A”). 
 471. Id. 
 472. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 657, 
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-269 to 271 (1996) (codified as amended in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(q)(2)(A) (2012)). While the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the statute, as 
amended, is constitutional, lower courts have upheld it. See, e.g., United States v. Tait, 202 
F.3d 1320, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding the revised statute constitutional); United 
States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1038 (8th Cir. 1999) (same). 
 473. Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, supra note 470. 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. 
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firearms cases filed; that number grew to 3,621 in 1995.476 But in 1996, 
the number of new prosecutions dropped to 3,162—a fifteen percent 
decline from the prior year477—and the number held more or less 
steady through 1997.478 Beginning in 1998, however, the number of 
prosecutions ticked upward: 3,641 firearms cases in 1998;479 4,367 
cases in 1999;480 5,387 cases in 2000;481 and a whopping 9,246 new cases 
in 2004.482 Keeping in mind that these figures represent all weapons-
related offenses, at most, Lopez may have had an initial dampening 
effect upon prosecutorial zeal in such cases but one that wore off 
within a few years. 
With respect to the civil dockets of the federal courts, 
developments since Morrison are mixed. The 1990s saw an overall 
increase in the federal district courts’ civil dockets: from 217,879 new 
civil cases in 1990483 to 260,271 new cases in 1999.484 But that trend was 
not one of linear growth. Of particular note, in the period 
immediately after Morrison, the number of district court civil filings 
dropped: in 2001 there was a 3.3% decrease in cases from the number 
filed the previous year.485 Given that civil cases may involve only 
private parties, it would, however, be odd to suggest that the decision 
in Morrison somehow explains the decline. Since 2001, the civil 
 
 476. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.D-2 (1997), http://www
.uscourts.gov/file/12927/download [http://perma.cc/FYS2-HKEQ]. 
 477. Id. 
 478. Id. For 1997, the figure was 3,184 weapons and firearms offenses cases. Id. 
 479. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.D-2 (2000), http://www
.uscourts.gov/file/12930/download [http://perma.cc/KGW2-KPBS]. 
 480. Id. 
 481. Id. 
 482. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
STATISTICS tbl.D-2 (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/12921/download [http://perma.cc
/MW4B-24KE]. 
 483. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl.4.1 
(2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/13171/download [http://perma.cc/XQN4-G8X8]. 
 484. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.C (2000), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/12214/download [http://perma.cc/KSH6-NHFG]. 
 485. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.C (2001), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/12215/download [http://perma.cc/3CKY-ZHSZ] (indicating 
that 259,517 civil cases were filed in 2000 and 250,907 cases were filed in 2001). 
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docket of the district courts has yo-yoed486 from a low of 252,962 new 
cases in 2003 to a recent high of 303,820 new cases in 2014.487 
Appeals to the circuit courts (in both criminal and civil cases) 
rose steadily from 49,784 appeals in 1994 to 53,895 appeals in 1999488 
and to 70,375 appeals in 2006.489 After 2006, however, appeals receded 
annually so that in 2014, just 55,623 new appeals were filed, producing 
a twenty-six percent decline over the course of seven years.490 
In assessing the above statistics, the number of judges sharing 
this caseload affects how these figures reflect the actual work of the 
courts. Since 1994 (the year before Lopez), Congress has created 
thirty-one new permanent district court judgeships but no new circuit 
court judgeships.491 Based simply on the numbers of cases, since 1994 
the number of criminal cases per district court judgeship has 
increased by about forty-six percent.492 Since 1999 (the year before 
Morrison) the number of civil cases per district court judgeship has 
increased by about six percent.493 The number of cases per appellate 
 
 486. For example, district court judges saw over 274,000 new cases filed in 2002; nearly 
253,000 in 2003; over 281,000 in 2004, and back to about 253,000 in 2005. ADMIN. OFFICE 
OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 120 tbl.C (2003), http://www.uscourts.gov/file
/12217/download [http://perma.cc/D6PU-JEH3]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.C (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/12219/download [http://perma
.cc/NG9T-5HVQ]. 
 487. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 120 tbl.C (2003), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/12217/download [http://perma.cc/F7C3-8RQ5]; ADMIN. OFFICE 
OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C (2014), http://www
.uscourts.gov/file/12201/download [http://perma.cc/Z2AG-GRDF]. 
 488. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
STATISTICS tbl.JCI (2003), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/13500/download [http://perma.cc
/W6B5-AK4G]. 
 489. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 
tbl.B (2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/12109/download [http://perma.cc/X27H-X3VX]. 
 490. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 
tbl.B (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/12103/download [http://perma.cc/V8WY-E2B2]. 
 491. Authorized Judgeships—From 1789 to Present, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS 7–8, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts
/JudgesJudgeships/docs/all-judgeships.pdf [http://perma.cc/U5U8-ZN3W]. 
 492. In 1994, there were 632 district court judgeships and 45,484 new criminal filings. 
Id. at 7; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 464, at 16. In 2014, there were 
663 district court judgeships and 66,193 new criminal filings. Authorized Judgeships—
From 1789 to Present, supra note 491, at 8; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra 
note 468, at tbl.D. This represents an increase from seventy-two new cases per judgeship 
to 100 new cases per judgeship, i.e. an increase of thirty-nine percent. 
 493. In 1999, there were 641 district court judgeships and 260,271 new civil filings. 
Authorized Judgeships—From 1789 to Present, supra note 491, at 7; ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 484, at tbl.C. In 2014, there were 663 district court 
judgeships and 303,820 new civil filings, an increase from 406 new cases per judgeship to 
458 new cases per judgeship, i.e. an increase of thirteen percent. Authorized Judgeships—
From 1789 to Present, supra note 491, at 8; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
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judgeship has risen by about thirteen percent since 1994.494 District 
courts and circuit courts thus have more cases than they did before 
Lopez and Morrison—with the largest increase occurring in the 
criminal dockets of the federal district courts. The added burden of 
additional cases is even higher than these numbers suggest because, as 
a result of delays in nominating and confirming judges to vacant seats, 
not all of the available judgeships are filled.495 
Nonetheless, the more dire predictions of the 1995 Long Range 
Plan496 did not materialize. Recall that the plan concluded that the 
federal district courts were on a path to docketing 364,800 cases 
(criminal and civil) in 2000 and 610,800 cases in 2010.497 In fact, the 
numbers turned out to be only about 324,000498 cases and 360,000499 
cases in those years respectively: the Plan’s predicted surge in the first 
decade of the new millennium simply did not occur. A further signal 
that crisis was averted—or its risk overstated—is the Judicial 
Conference’s 2010 “Strategic Plan for the Federal Judiciary.”500 In 
contrast to the doomsday calls for fundamental change in the 1995 
plan, the 2010 plan offers in a breezy eighteen pages a few modest 
proposals: increasing judicial compensation in order to continue to 
attract high-quality judges;501 making “more effective use” of senior 
judges;502 and some minor modernizations to improve administrative 
efficiency.503 The most significant development since Lopez and 
 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file
/12201/download [http://perma.cc/Z2AG-GRDF]. 
 494. In 1994, there were 167 appellate judgeships and 49,784 appeals. Authorized 
Judgeships—From 1789 to Present, supra note 491, at 7; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, supra note 488, at tbl.JCI. In 2014, the number of judgeships remained at 167 but 
the number of appeals had increased to 55,623. This represents an increase from 298 cases 
per judgeship to 333 cases per judgeship, i.e. an increase of eleven percent. Authorized 
Judgeships—From 1789 to Present, supra note 491, at 8; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, supra note 490, at tbl.B. 
 495. See Current Judicial Vacancies, U.S. COURTS: JUDGES & JUDGESHIPS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/current-judicial-vacancies 
(last updated Nov. 9, 2015) [http://perma.cc/2R94-TJ6X] (reporting sixty-seven lower 
federal court vacancies). 
 496. See supra note 342 and accompanying text. 
 497. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 316, at 75. 
 498. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 
tbl.JCI (2001), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/13494/download [http://perma.cc/WSX9-JWZ3]. 
 499. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 
tbl.JCI (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/13491/download [http://perma.cc/63J7-VUCV]. 
 500. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/2748/download [http://perma.cc/59LN-LLFC]. 
 501. Id. at 7. 
 502. Id. at 8. 
 503. Id. 
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Morrison might, then, be the disappearance of a deep sense that 
something must be done in order to save the federal courts. 
The decline in urgency on the judicial side may reflect 
developments on the legislative. There is at least some indication that 
since 2000 Congress (whether as a result of the Court’s admonitions 
or not) has exercised more legislative restraint than it did in previous 
decades. Commentators report a slowdown in the rate of enactment 
of new federal criminal statutes.504 Between 2000 and 2011, Congress 
enacted fewer than fifty major federal criminal statutes, a drop from 
eighty such statutes in the previous decade,505 representing a return to 
a rate of federal criminal lawmaking last seen in the 1960s.506 This 
drop in the number of new federal criminal statutes tracks an overall 
decline in congressional lawmaking.507 More generally, members of 
Congress have recently shown a keener awareness of concerns 
Rehnquist repeatedly articulated: the House Committee on the 
Judiciary has formed an “Over-Criminalization Task Force” to 
address “the growing problem of over-criminalization and over-
federalization.”508 That said, it is well to remember that old habits die 
hard: within a year of the Lopez decision, Congress invoked the 
Commerce Clause as a basis for new criminal laws such as the Church 
Arson Prevention Act509 and the Child Pornography Prevention 
Act.510 
H. Summary 
Lopez and Morrison represented the culmination of more than a 
century of efforts by the Supreme Court to safeguard the role of the 
 
 504. Klein & Grobey, supra note 469, at 14. 
 505. Id. 
 506. Id. 
 507. See Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Powers, 
2013 WIS. L. REV. 1097, 1099, 1104 (2013) (identifying 650 new statutes from the 101st 
Congress (1989–1991) but just 377 new statutes from the 107th Congress (2001–2003) and 
attributing the decline to congressional gridlock). 
 508. Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-Criminalization and Over-Federalization: 
Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, Member, H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 509. Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110 Stat. 1392 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 247(b) 
(2012)) (prohibiting the destruction of religious real property that affects interstate or 
foreign commerce). 
 510. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2252, 2256 
(2006)) (prohibiting the interstate distribution or receipt of sexually explicit visual 
depictions of minors). The Court ultimately held the Act unconstitutional on First 
Amendment grounds. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). 
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judicial branch in our constitutional structure. Doctrinally, the cases 
involved questions of the scope of congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause and (in Morrison) the Fourteenth Amendment as 
well as the degree of deference courts owe to Congress when it 
legislates under those powers. By centering on these issues, however, 
debate over the outcomes in Lopez and Morrison has overlooked a 
more basic justification for the Court’s rulings. When the Court acts 
to protect the judiciary—and particularly when it does so only after 
repeated requests to Congress for help—it is on firmer constitutional 
ground than critics of Lopez and Morrison have recognized. Federal 
lawmaking does not always present a docket issue and docket issues 
do not always undermine the security of the judicial branch. At the 
time of Lopez and Morrison, however, the judiciary viewed itself to 
be under considerable stress and there was no indication that 
Congress—continuing to create new federal causes of action—would 
provide relief. Under those circumstances, the Court’s response—
invalidating one criminal statute and one civil cause of action—was 
less revolutionary than preservationist. 
IV. BEYOND LOPEZ AND MORRISON 
Docket control goes a long way in explaining Lopez and 
Morrison. Docket control also sheds helpful light on other decisions 
of the Supreme Court, including decisions that are not conventionally 
thought of as involving questions of federalism. In this Part, we 
explore some areas in which a docket control account may prove 
useful, including further often-discussed examples from the 
Rehnquist Court and even extending the rationale as far back as 
Marbury. 
A. The Rest of the Rehnquist-Era Revolution 
Docket control may helpfully serve as a common thread in 
decisions of the Rehnquist Court across a wide range of topics. For 
example, the Rehnquist Court invoked Tenth Amendment principles 
to limit the application of federal law to state governments511 and it 
crafted broad rules of Eleventh Amendment state sovereign 
immunity.512 In several notable contexts it ruled that there existed no 
 
 511. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 462, 470 (1991) (adopting a “plain 
statement” statutory requirement to hold that the Federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act did not apply to state judges). 
 512. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373–74 (2001) (holding that Congress 
did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding abrogation 
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private right of action under federal law513 or construed jurisdictional 
statutes so as to preclude a federal hearing514 or to create concurrent 
state court jurisdiction.515 It embraced broad understandings of the 
abstention doctrine (something Rehnquist had long championed)516 as 
a basis for denying federal court intervention.517 It took a broad 
approach to the use of arbitration in lieu of judicial resolution of 
 
invalid in Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646–48 (1999) (holding that because 
Congress lacks power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause, 
abrogation by Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act was invalid); 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72, 75–76 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against states to 
enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause and that the doctrine 
of Ex parte Young could also not be used to enforce the law against a state official). 
 513. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002) (holding that the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act’s non-disclosure provisions confer no enforceable 
rights under § 1983); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that there is 
no private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 73–74 (2001) 
(holding that federal inmate cannot bring Eighth Amendment claim against private 
operator of correctional facility); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (holding that 
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act does not create rights enforceable in an 
action under § 1983 and does not create an implied private cause of action). 
 514. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 553 (1989) (holding that the FTCA 
does not provide federal district court with jurisdiction over defendants other than the 
United States). An additional important example, in the last term of the Burger Court, is 
the decision, joined by Rehnquist, in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 
U.S. 804 (1986), that an alleged violation of a federal statute, as part of a claim, is not 
sufficient for the federal courts to exercise federal question jurisdiction (under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331) if the statute alleged to have been violated does not itself create a private cause of 
action. See id. at 810 (“We have consistently emphasized that, in exploring the outer 
reaches of § 1331, determinations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments 
about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system.”). 
  We recognize, of course, that the construction of jurisdictional statutes to limit 
cases that could be brought in federal court did not begin with Rehnquist or the Rehnquist 
Court. The well-pleaded complaint rule is one much earlier example of the practice. See 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 154 (1908) (holding that federal 
question jurisdiction can only arise if the plaintiff’s own cause of action shows a federal 
statutory or constitutional claim independent of any anticipated defenses). 
 515. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 467 (1990) (holding that state courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims because “[n]othing in the language, 
structure, legislative history, or underlying policies of RICO suggests that Congress 
intended otherwise”). 
 516. See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606–07 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.) 
(invoking “considerations of comity and federalism” to extend Younger abstention to 
certain state civil proceedings). 
 517. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 2 (1987) (holding that Younger 
abstention applied where judgment debtor brought federal action to challenge the 
constitutionality of a Texas court judgment’s application of lien and appeal bond). 
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claims.518 It adopted generous rules of immunity shielding government 
officials from lawsuits.519 Announcing that “[s]ummary judgment 
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural 
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a 
whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action,’ ”520 it clarified, in a famous trilogy, the 
standards by which judges could resolve cases on summary judgment 
rather than have them to proceed to trial.521 In each of these areas, the 
Court limited the possibilities of bringing a case to federal court in the 
first place or gave federal judges additional tools to dispose of cases 
before them. Some commentators have viewed many of these cases as 
reflecting the Court’s hostility to certain kinds of claims522 
(particularly civil rights claims)523 or to litigation in general,524 but 
 
 518. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding 
that a claim under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act can be subjected 
to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement); Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1989) (holding that an agreement to 
arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 is enforceable). 
 519. See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197–98, 201 (2004) (per curiam) 
(holding that because it was not clearly established law that use of deadly force against 
fleeing suspect violated Fourth Amendment, officer was entitled to qualified immunity); 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 206–08 (2001) (holding that “[i]f the law did not put the 
officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on 
qualified immunity is appropriate” and therefore officer who reasonably but mistakenly 
believed amount of force used was lawful was entitled to qualified immunity), abrogated 
by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 520. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 521. See, e.g., id. at 325–26 (clarifying the shifting allocations of burdens of production, 
persuasion, and proof at summary judgment and holding that the moving party need only 
point out an absence of evidence supporting the alleged claim such that there is no 
requirement that the moving party provide affidavits or other material); Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255–56 (1986) (holding that in order to avoid a motion 
for summary judgment plaintiffs in a libel suit were required to meet the burden they 
would face at trial and they had failed to do so); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (holding in an antitrust conspiracy suit that in order 
to survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party was required to “do 
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”). 
 522. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, 
and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691, 711 (2000) (describing 
the Rehnquist Court as holding “a genuine antipathy to privately-initiated litigation as a 
mechanism to control government wrongdoing”). 
 523. See, e.g., LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (1994) 
(“The Supreme Court’s decisions . . . have taken far too much decision-making away from 
the federal courts and given it to the courts of the states. . . . [T]he federal courts have lost 
the capacity to check the . . . power of government . . . .”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the 
Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 539 (2003) 
(describing a pattern of the Rehnquist Court in preventing civil rights litigants from 
accessing courts in order to seek relief); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney 
General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 186 (2003) (writing that the Rehnquist Court “launched 
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docket control provides an alternative account. We do not mean to 
overstate the claim. The Court’s decisions in these areas, as in the 
context of enumerated federal powers,525 do not share a single 
direction526 and there is debate about the actual impact of these cases 
on the workload of the federal courts.527 Nonetheless, the overall 
result is some additional tools to trim some528 of the caseload of the 
federal courts.529 
 
a wholesale assault on one of the primary mechanisms Congress has used for enforcing 
civil rights: the private attorney general”). 
 524. See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an 
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1107 
(2006) (“In case after case and in wildly divergent areas of the law, the Rehnquist Court 
has expressed a profound hostility to litigation.”). That said, Professor Siegel ends up 
concluding that “the great bulk of the litigation-hostile decisions . . . forward the policies or 
social vision of modern American conservatism,” id. at 1199, by, among other things, 
“favor[ing] business interests by limiting damages, closing courts, or otherwise making it 
difficult for civil plaintiffs to prevail . . . .” Id. at 1199 n.452. 
 525. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2–3 (2005) (holding that the Commerce 
Clause permits the federal government to ban intra-state possession of marijuana for 
medicinal use). Notably in Raich, three of the Justices in the majority in Lopez and 
Morrison (O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Thomas) dissented. See id. at 34 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he case before us is materially indistinguishable from Lopez and 
Morrison . . . .”). 
 526. See, e.g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 89 (2004) (holding that the Tax Injunction 
Act did not bar Establishment Clause challenge in federal court to state tax credits); 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (holding abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity proper under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act with respect to 
right to access courtroom); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 739–40 
(2003) (holding that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity under the 
family-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 
13–14 (1998) (holding that a group of voters had standing to challenge ruling by Federal 
Election Committee on issue of disclosure requirement of federal election law). 
 527. For example, there has been considerable debate as to whether the summary 
judgment trilogy actually resulted in district courts resolving more cases on summary 
judgment. Compare Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: 
Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1339 (2005) (proposing a link 
between the trilogy and declining jury trials), with Linda S. Mullenix, The 25th 
Anniversary of the Summary Judgment Trilogy: Much Ado About Very Little, 43 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 561, 561–62 (2012) (“[T]he trilogy has not resulted in federal judges granting or 
denying summary judgment in statistically significant ways than before the trilogy.”). 
 528. The qualification is important. The Eleventh Amendment, for example, does not 
protect the states from all litigation. Notably, it does not preclude seeking prospective 
injunctive relief against a state official. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 124–25 (1908), 
superseded by statute, Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, sec. 1, § 702, 90 Stat. 2721, 
2721. The Eleventh Amendment also has no application to cities or counties. Hess v. Port 
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47 (1994). 
 529. Some of the decisions, of course, do more than that: they also remove cases from 
state court. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754–55 (1999) (holding that state 
sovereign immunity applies also in state court when a state is sued under federal law). But 
this effect (which might in any event be limited: there might well exist alternative state law 
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B. Habeas Corpus 
Lopez and Morrison coincided with a remarkable shift in the 
rules governing federal habeas claims by state inmates. During the 
1960s, a period in which the Supreme Court crafted and imposed 
upon state courts new rights for criminal defendants,530 the Court also 
significantly expanded the opportunities for federal courts to review 
through habeas petitions state court convictions and sentences.531 
From the time he arrived at the Court in 1972, Rehnquist took a 
strong position (one he had held as a law clerk)532 that federal habeas 
review of state court proceedings should instead be extremely 
limited.533 Initially, Rehnquist expressed this view most often in 
dissenting opinions.534 However, as like-minded colleagues joined the 
 
causes of action) may merely be an unavoidable byproduct of protecting the dockets of the 
federal courts. 
 530. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (incorporating Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial against the states); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 
(1966) (requiring exclusion of statements made in the course of custodial interrogation 
unless suspect was warned of right to remain silent and right to counsel and voluntarily 
waived those rights); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 (1963) (requiring 
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants charged with serious offenses in state 
court); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961) (applying Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule to state proceedings). 
 531. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (holding that a federal habeas 
petitioner may raise claims not presented at trial in state court unless the petitioner 
“deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts.”), overruled by 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87–88 (1977); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 6 
(1963) (allowing multiple habeas petitions); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963) 
(allowing development of factual record as part of federal habeas procedure), overruled by 
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). 
 532. See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2343 n.52 
(1993) (reporting on the memorandum with the title “Habeas Corpus Then and Now; Or, 
‘If I Can Just Find the Right Judge, Over These Prison Walls I Shall Fly,’ ” that Rehnquist 
prepared as a law clerk to Justice Robert Jackson). 
 533. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (“[T]he historic meaning 
of habeas corpus . . . [is] to afford relief to those whom society has ‘grievously 
wronged.’ ”); id. at 633 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) (“The role of 
federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights are 
observed, is secondary and limited [to state proceedings]. Federal courts are not forums in 
which to relitigate state trials.”)). 
 534. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 837–39 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(dissenting from Court’s holding that inmates have a fundamental right of court access 
that includes a right to law books on the ground that “[t]he prisoners here in question have 
all pursued all avenues of direct appeal available to them from their judgments of 
conviction” and “there is nothing in the United States Constitution which requires that a 
convict serving a term of imprisonment in a state penal institution pursuant to a final 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction have a ‘right of access’ to the federal courts 
in order to attack his sentence”); see also Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 957, 958, 964 
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (writing that by allowing “so 
many bites at the apple,” habeas corpus has produced a “mockery of our criminal justice 
94 N.C. L. REV. 7 (2015) 
92 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
Court and as greater attention turned to the impact of habeas cases 
upon the dockets of federal courts and the resulting instability for 
state court processes, Rehnquist’s position became more frequently 
that of the majority. The Burger Court cut back on some of the 
habeas innovations of the Warren Court.535 As Chief Justice, 
Rehnquist presided over a more dramatic curtailment of federal 
habeas review.536 
Rehnquist’s efforts to reform habeas extended beyond the 
courtroom. As Chief Justice, he repeatedly urged Congress to limit by 
statute the ability of state inmates to bring habeas petitions to federal 
court and the power of federal judges to hear them.537 Among other 
 
system” and urging review of lower court decision in order to shut off all federal claims by 
petitioner such that “the jurisdiction of the federal courts over petitioner’s sentence of 
death would be at an end, and . . . it would presumably be carried out”); Estelle v. Jurek, 
450 U.S. 1014, 1019, 1021 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(writing in response to the Court’s denial of review in a case in which the petitioner had 
obtained habeas relief from the Fifth Circuit on the ground that a confession he had made 
was involuntary, that “[t]he severity of a defendant’s punishment . . . simply has no bearing 
on the extent to which federal habeas courts should defer to state-court findings[,]” and 
that “[b]y overturning Jurek’s conviction on the basis of a procedural nicety, the decision 
below . . . frustrates society’s compelling interest in having its constitutionally valid laws 
swiftly and surely carried out”). 
 535. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85–91 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding 
that failure to present a claim in state court bars federal review of the claim absent a 
showing of cause and prejudice); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (barring habeas 
review of Fourth Amendment issues). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About 
Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 749 (1987) (“Perhaps the area where the 
Burger Court most dramatically departed from the Warren Court precedents was in the 
area of habeas corpus.”). 
 536. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 320–24, 327–28 (1995) (holding that a 
petitioner who defaulted in state court can proceed on the federal petition only if 
forfeiture would result in a miscarriage of justice because of the petitioner’s “actual 
innocence,” meaning “that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 
convicted him”); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637–38 (rejecting “harmless error beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard in habeas cases in favor of a test of whether an error had a 
“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict”); Herrera v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 391, 400 (1993) (holding that an actual claim of innocence is an 
insufficient basis for habeas relief unless the petitioner can show evidence of “an 
independent constitutional violation” in the state proceeding); Keeney, 504 U.S. at 2 
(1992) (prohibiting subsequent petitions absent exceptional situations); McCleskey v. 
Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991) (holding that negligence by an attorney is cause for a 
procedural default only if it rises to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel); Teague 
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989) (plurality) (holding that a new rule does not generally 
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review). 
 537. For example, speaking before the American Law Institute in 1990 about habeas 
review in capital cases, Rehnquist said that delays in carrying out executions created by 
collateral review has produced a system that “verges on the chaotic” and “cries out for 
reform.” Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Address Before American Law Institute 
(May 16, 1990); see also DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE 
REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 412–13 (1992) (“Rehnquist had become determined to 
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steps, in 1988, Rehnquist appointed a committee chaired by Justice 
Powell to propose reforms to habeas litigation in capital cases. 
Ignoring a vote by the Judicial Conference to defer action on the 
committee’s report (which advocated significant reductionist 
measures), Rehnquist on his own submitted it to Congress. This 
action triggered a statutory requirement that the chair of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee introduce reform legislation within fifteen days 
of transmittal of the report.538 The resulting bill did not, however, pass 
Congress and other legislative efforts also stalled.539 However, one 
year after Lopez, Congress delivered: Title I of the Federal 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”),540 a law Rehnquist had publicly supported, placed 
numerous restrictions on federal habeas review of state court 
convictions and sentences.541 
The combination of AEDPA and the habeas decisions of the 
Rehnquist Court worked a dramatic change.542 In his 1997 annual 
report on the federal judiciary, Rehnquist stated approvingly: “As of 
June 1997, the number of habeas corpus applications has fallen well 
below the average number of monthly filings during the 15 months 
prior to the law’s enactment in April of 1996.”543 More recent data 
confirm the longer-term effect of the reform efforts Rehnquist led. A 
study of a randomly selected sample of federal habeas petitions found 
that forty-two percent of petitions in noncapital cases filed during 
2003 and 2004 and twenty-eight percent of petitions in capital cases 
filed from 2000 and 2002 were dismissed without the courts reaching 
 
change the [habeas] system. It was chaotic, wasteful, and an abuse of the people’s right to 
have laws enforced, he contended in series of speeches.”). 
 538. Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, Judicial Activism and Legislative “Reform” of 
Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of Recent Developments and Current 
Proposals, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1, 56–61 (1991). 
 539. Id. 
 540. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
(2012)). 
 541. Among other things, AEDPA requires deference to state court findings of fact; 
bars granting a habeas petition on the basis of an issue adjudicated in state court unless 
that state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 
imposes a one-year time limit (from the date a conviction becomes final) for filing a 
habeas petition; and strictly limits subsequent petitions. Id.; see also LARRY W. YACKLE, 
FEDERAL COURTS 662–82 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing the consequences of AEDPA for 
federal habeas corpus jurisprudence). 
 542. Sue Davis, The Chief Justice and Judicial Decision-Making: The Institutional Basis 
for Leadership on the Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW 
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 143 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) 
(describing Rehnquist’s “victory in reducing habeas corpus”). 
 543. REHNQUIST, supra note 296, at 5. 
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the merits.544 Of the 341 petitions in noncapital filings studied, the 
petitioner received the requested relief in only one; this is a 
significant departure from the rate of relief for noncapital filings prior 
to AEDPA where the petitioner received relief in one out of every 
one hundred petitions.545 In another study, forty percent of state 
capital prisoners who filed federal habeas petitions had their 
convictions or sentences overturned before the enactment of the 1996 
law; between 2000 and 2006 that number dropped to twelve percent 
and it continues to decline.546 
Throughout Rehnquist’s own early opinions urging limits to 
habeas review and the later opinions of the Court imposing such 
limits, there is a focus that is consistent with the account of Lopez and 
Morrison offered in this Article. First, in case after case, there is 
concern with the burden habeas petitions from state inmates impose 
upon the lower federal courts547 (even though such petitions have 
always represented a relatively small portion of the overall federal 
docket).548 As with Lopez and Morrison, the docket concern rested 
upon issues of constitutional structure. Strong federal habeas review 
of state court convictions and sentences risks displacing the state 
courts as the place where criminal trials occur, alters the division of 
labor between the federal and state courts, and degrades both 
 
 544. NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 2, 9 (2007), http://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219558.pdf [http://perma.cc/9SD2-HK8N]. 
 545. Id. at 9. 
 546. David R. Dow & Eric M. Freedman, The Effects of AEDPA on Justice, in THE 
FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 261, 265–67 (Charles S. Lanier et al. eds., 2009) 
(citing a study that examined every capital case in the United States between 1973 and 
1995). 
 547. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 704 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“Despite its meager benefits, the relitigation of Miranda 
claims on habeas imposes substantial costs . . . [by] consum[ing] scarce judicial resources 
on an issue unrelated to guilt or innocence.”); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) 
(“Federal collateral litigation places a heavy burden on scarce federal judicial resources, 
and threatens the capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes.”); Stone v. Powell, 
428 U.S. 465, 493 (1976) (“[T]he additional contribution, if any, of the consideration of 
search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in relation to the 
costs.”). 
 548. See Linda Greenhouse, A Window on the Court; Limits on Inmates’ Habeas 
Corpus Petitions Illuminate Mood and Agenda of the Justices, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1992, at 
A1 (reporting that the 10,000 habeas petitions state inmates file each year in federal 
district court represent five percent of the civil cases filed). In the twelve-month period 
ending March 31, 2013, there were 271,950 civil cases filed in the federal district courts of 
which 18,815 were habeas cases. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=
/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2013/tables/C02Mar13.pdf [http://perma
.cc/45T2-FJ8F]. 
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systems.549 On this account, when the Supreme Court announces—in 
cases like Duncan, Miranda, Gideon, and Mapp550—constitutional 
rules that apply in criminal trials in state courts, the task of 
implementing those rules should fall on the state courts that conduct 
the trials (with the possibility of review at the end of the process by 
the U.S. Supreme Court). Having the lower federal courts oversee the 
application of federal constitutional rules in ordinary state criminal 
trials is inconsistent with the federalist division of labor in our judicial 
system.551 In sum, the Rehnquist Court’s habeas decisions worked in 
tandem with Lopez as docket controlling devices. Lopez ensured 
traditional state law crimes—like gun possession—were prosecuted in 
state courts; the habeas decisions prevented those state court cases 
from later appearing in federal court after the state trial and 
conviction. 
C. Marbury 
A good test of an idea is its ability to shed new light on an issue 
thought firmly settled. To that end, our docket control account 
provides new insight into the most famous Supreme Court decision of 
all: Marbury v. Madison.552 
 
 549. See, e.g., Withrow, 507 U.S. at 704 (O’Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in 
part) (“[T]he relitigation of Miranda claims on habeas . . . creates tension between the 
state and federal courts. And it upsets the division of responsibilities that underlies our 
federal system.”); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (referring to “comity 
and federalism” as reasons for limiting habeas review); id. at 636 (“State courts are fully 
qualified to identify constitutional error and evaluate its prejudicial effect on the trial 
process.”); id. at 637 (“Overturning final and presumptively correct convictions on 
collateral review because the State cannot prove that an error is harmless . . . infringes 
upon their sovereignty over criminal matters.”). 
 550. See supra note 530. 
 551. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991) (“This is a case about 
federalism. It concerns the respect that federal courts owe the States and the States’ 
procedural rules when reviewing the claims of state prisoners in federal habeas corpus.”); 
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (“The States possess primary authority for 
defining and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they also hold the initial 
responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal 
trials frustrate both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith 
attempts to honor constitutional rights.”); id. at 127 (“Liberal allowance of the writ . . . 
degrades the prominence of the trial itself.”); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) 
(“The failure of the federal habeas courts generally to require compliance with a 
contemporaneous-objection rule tends to detract from the perception of the trial of a 
criminal case in state court as a decisive and portentous event. . . . To the greatest extent 
possible all issues . . . should be determined in this proceeding . . . . [T]he state trial on the 
merits [should be] the ‘main event,’ . . . rather than a ‘tryout on the road’ for what will later 
be the determinative federal habeas hearing.”). 
 552. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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Today, Marbury is routinely understood as the landmark case 
that established judicial review and judicial supremacy: the power of 
the Supreme Court to determine the meaning of the Federal 
Constitution in a way that binds other branches of government and to 
review laws (and government action more generally) for consistency 
with what the Constitution requires.553 Invoking Marbury, “judges, 
lawyers, politicians, and the general public today accept the principle 
of judicial supremacy—indeed, they assume it as a matter of 
course.”554 Yet that view of Marbury represents a modern 
understanding of the case.555 At the time it was decided, Marbury was 
viewed in more modest terms; indeed, the decision attracted relatively 
little attention.556 As Professor Paulsen has shown, the broad notion 
of judicial review and supremacy attributed to Marbury today is more 
a modern myth that has built up around the case than a reflection of 
what Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion accomplished.557 
Instead of asserting a bold new claim to judicial supremacy, 
Marshall’s opinion may be alternatively understood as having 
reiterated the uncontroversial notion that courts have a “a coordinate, 
coequal power . . . to judge for themselves the conformity of acts of the 
other two branches with the fundamental law of the Constitution, and 
to refuse to give acts contradicting the Constitution any force or effect 
 
 553. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833 n.40 (1988) (“That the task of 
interpreting the great, sweeping clauses of the Constitution ultimately falls to us has been 
for some time an accepted principle of American jurisprudence. See Marbury v. Madison, 
1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (‘It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is’).”); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) 
(“[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever been respected by the 
Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional 
system.”); CLIFF SLOAN & DAVID MCKEAN, THE GREAT DECISION: JEFFERSON, 
ADAMS, MARSHALL, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT 190 (1st ed. 2009) 
(describing Marbury as “firmly establish[ing] the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of the 
Constitution”). 
 554. Kramer, supra note 4, at 6–7. 
 555. See generally ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 220 (1989) (attributing the Court’s adoption of a power of judicial supremacy 
grounded in Marbury to the efforts of the Warren Court in 1985); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, 
THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 10 (2007) 
(“It is the modern Court, not the early Court, that has been most aggressive in asserting 
the reality of judicial supremacy.”). 
 556. See CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 48–49 (1996) (recounting muted response to Marbury at the time the 
case was decided). 
 557. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
2706, 2706–43 (2003). 
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insofar as application of the judicial power is concerned.”558 In other 
words, when asked to decide a case before it, a court is required to 
apply the law, and the law includes the Constitution. If forced to 
choose between a statutory provision and a constitutional 
requirement, a court gives effect to the Constitution. By the same 
token, because the other branches of government are also bound by 
the Constitution, when they carry out their tasks—enacting legislation 
(Congress) and implementing laws (the Executive)—they too 
necessarily engage in interpreting the Constitution’s meaning.559 Thus, 
rather than the Supreme Court serving as the ultimate arbiter of 
constitutional meaning, Marbury affirmed that “no branch has 
interpretive supremacy; that each branch has independent 
interpretive power within its own sphere.”560 
This more modest understanding of Marbury makes considerable 
additional sense when the case is read in light of the docket concerns 
articulated in this Article. Although Marshall did not refer to the 
Supreme Court’s workload in his opinion, a concern with docket 
control tracks the facts of the case, aligns with much of the language 
of the opinion, and reflects the hazards the Court confronted in the 
early years of the Republic. Rather than establishing judicial 
supremacy or even a general power of judicial review, when viewed in 
terms of dockets, Marbury stands for the more limited proposition 
that the Court has particular constitutional authority to act in order to 
preserve its own status and role in the constitutional scheme. That is 
to say, whatever the merits of judicial review in general, the Court is 
on very firm constitutional ground when it refuses to give effect to 
laws that unduly burden the judiciary or when it otherwise resists 
actions by the other branches of government that would undermine 
the core role of the judicial branch. 
On this approach, the problem with Section 13 of the Judiciary 
Act, which, as Marshall read it, expanded the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction, was that it risked turning the Supreme Court into 
a go-to panel of low-level arbiters of citizen-official disputes. Mired in 
deciding original applications for writs of mandamus and perhaps 
other small-potato tasks Congress might assign in the future, the 
Court would face significant difficulties in fulfilling the roles the 
Constitution requires of it—including serving as a national appellate 
court. It was bad enough that the early Congress required the Justices 
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to ride circuit and stubbornly refused to relieve them of that 
hardship.561 If Congress could also force open the Court’s door in the 
first instance to mandamus petitions, the Justices would never be 
much more than minor magistrates hearing potentially thousands of 
complaints about what government officials had done or failed to do. 
Lopez thus sheds light on Marbury, and Marbury in turn provides a 
solid justification for the Lopez ruling: the Court has particular 
constitutional authority to protect the judiciary from burdens 
imposed by the political branches that undermine the place of the 
judiciary in the constitutional scheme. 
Many of the famous lines from Marbury, routinely cited as 
supporting judicial review and judicial supremacy, might well stand 
for the more basic idea that the Constitution protects the courts from 
incursions by the other branches of government. For example, 
Marshall states: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”562 Duty may indeed entail 
power (the conventional reading in support of a preeminent role for 
courts) but it also entails work: a duty, after all, is an unavoidable 
obligation. Extra duties assigned to the Court could make it harder to 
fulfill those that are, as a constitutional matter, its actual 
responsibilities. On this point, Marshall’s invocation of the term 
“duty” in Cohens v. Virginia563 is illuminating. Holding, in Cohens, 
that the Court could review certain state court criminal convictions, 
Marshall wrote that the Court has 
no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is 
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the 
other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may 
occur which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. 
All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and 
conscientiously to perform our duty.564 
Cohens is the bookend to Marbury. Because the Court has certain 
constitutionally assigned duties it must fulfill, it should be attentive to 
efforts on the part of Congress to give it other tasks to perform. The 
duty to hear some cases comes with the duty to refuse to hear others. 
Additional language in Marbury addresses the tension between 
cases the Constitution compels the Court to hear and cases Congress 
instructs the Court to hear. Marshall wrote that “the framers of the 
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constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the 
government of courts, as well as of the legislature.”565 This statement 
is also often understood to sustain powers of judicial review and 
judicial supremacy. Yet the conventional reading might well overlook 
the significance of the term “government” in Marshall’s statement—a 
term that suggests orderly operations, under a set of rules, without 
outside interference. As a mechanism for government, the 
Constitution—not Congress—sets the outer parameters of what the 
Court may do. A similar idea is reflected in Marshall’s rhetorical 
question: “If an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is 
void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the Courts and oblige 
them to give it effect?”566 The answer to this question makes clear 
that it pays to recognize that giving “effect” to a law adds to the 
workload of a court. Again, read through the lens of dockets, 
Marshall’s opinion is less about establishing what the Court can do 
and more about carefully limiting what it must do. 
This Article does not contend that a concern with workload was 
all that is implied by these oft-cited statements: the point is that they 
comport with the basic concern of safeguarding the judicial branch 
from tasks that would undermine its capacity to perform its 
constitutional role. This docket-focused reading also brings to the 
fore some neglected portions of Marshall’s Marbury opinion that are 
focused specifically on the problem of Congress altering the workload 
of the Supreme Court. Marshall writes, for example: 
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the 
legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme 
and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would 
certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to 
have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it 
should be vested.567 
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In other words, the Constitution itself protects the courts from 
legislative “will” that could be exercised to reapportion judicial tasks. 
Perhaps most tellingly, Marbury shows that Marshall was clearly 
aware that a decision in William Marbury’s favor could open the 
Supreme Court’s door to complaints against other federal officials 
who had failed to carry out a duty under federal law. In a lengthy 
portion of his opinion that receives little attention today, Marshall 
sets forth other potential claims against federal officials failing to 
carry out legal obligations. Marshall invokes, for example, the federal 
statute requiring the Secretary of War to compile a pension list of war 
veterans568 and the laws requiring the Secretary of State to issue 
patents to applicants who have satisfied statutory requirements.569 
Both laws had an obvious potential to generate large numbers of 
applications to government officials to fulfill their statutorily-defined 
duties. In each instance, Marshall notes, a remedy would have to exist 
if the government official failed to act as the law required: “[W]here a 
specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the 
performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual 
who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his 
country for a remedy.”570 If that remedy lay with the Supreme Court 
in the first instance, it could quickly become overwhelmed. Granting 
Marbury’s petition, then, could flood the Court with like petitions for 
pensions, patents, and other entitlements. As Professor Pfander 
astutely observes, the Court’s decision in Marbury serves to limit 
“ ‘jurisdiction stuffing’—assignment to the Court of new, burdensome 
original business that could threaten its ability to discharge its 
important functions as a national court of appellate review.”571 
Marbury fits, then, with other decisions of the Marshall Court 
with docket implications. For example, three years after Marbury, in 
Strawbridge v. Curtiss,572 Marshall read the Judiciary Act of 1789 to 
require complete diversity among the parties as a prerequisite to 
federal diversity jurisdiction.573 In 1812, in United States v. Hudson & 
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Goodwin,574 the Court held there were no federal common law 
crimes; in order to exercise jurisdiction in criminal cases, the federal 
courts were dependent upon a federal criminal statute: “[t]he 
legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix 
a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction 
of the offence.”575 
As a historical matter, Marshall’s concern that Congress might 
neuter the Court by assigning it a slew of duties was not unwarranted. 
After the election of 1800, Jefferson took the White House and 
Republicans gained control of both houses of Congress, but the 
federal judiciary remained largely staffed by Federalist appointees—
including the controversial “midnight judges” Adams had appointed 
to the new circuit courts created by the lame-duck Congress under the 
Judiciary Act of 1801.576 In addition to a general concern that 
Federalist judges would be hostile to reforms the new administration 
sought to undertake, Jefferson and his supporters were deeply critical 
of many specific practices of sitting federal judges. The list of 
complaints was long. For one thing, the Jeffersonians complained, 
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federal judges had enforced the notorious Sedition Act.577 For 
another, the judges had acted in ways that undermined both 
separation of powers and federalism. As to the former, by invoking 
English precedents and enforcing common law crimes, federal judges 
had engaged—as Jefferson himself put it—in “audacious, barefaced 
and sweeping pretension to a system of law for the U.S. without the 
adoption of their legislature, and so infinitively beyond their power to 
adopt.”578 With respect to the federalism balance, Republicans had 
long believed the national judiciary was consolidating power at the 
expense of the state courts. “Consequently, they wished to remodel 
the entire judicial system in order to check the flow of business to the 
Supreme Court and thereby counteract the growth of centralization 
and nationalism which the federal courts had helped to promote.”579 
More generally, the judges (according to their critics) had strayed far 
from their appropriate judicial role: “Often rude, frequently partisan 
or intemperate, many . . . [federal judges] had . . . taken the 
opportunity—especially in charges to grand juries—to lecture and 
preach on morality, religion, and politics.”580 Finally, a personal 
element tainted the judiciary in the eyes of the new administration. 
While President Jefferson and Chief Justice Marshall were second 
cousins, they were “bitter political enemies,”581 a point reinforced 
when Marshall, having administered the Presidential oath, turned his 
back to Jefferson as he delivered his inauguration address.582 
Riding a wave of popular dissatisfaction with the federal 
courts,583 Republicans who took office wasted little time in seeking to 
challenge and reshape the federal judiciary. They repealed the 1801 
statute under which Adams had appointed a new layer of federal 
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judges, thus removing the Adams appointees from their posts.584 They 
also restored the circuit-riding duties of the Supreme Court Justices, a 
move that kept Marshall and his colleagues out of the capital for 
much of the year.585 Concerned that the Supreme Court might 
actually intervene to restore the judges Adams had appointed to their 
positions, the Republican Congress cancelled the Supreme Court’s 
upcoming term.586 In addition, at Jefferson’s urging, impeachment 
proceedings were brought in 1804 against staunch Federalist Samuel 
Chase on the basis of vague charges of political bias; while Chase was 
ultimately acquitted in the Senate, the incident underscored the 
hostility towards the judicial branch.587 
Marbury was thus decided in a context in which the judicial 
branch was under considerable threat. Keeping the Supreme Court 
focused on its core functions was a way to ensure it remained a 
significant part of the federal government. That required refusing to 
take on duties that would distract the Justices from their central tasks. 
From this perspective, the constitutional significance of Marbury lies 
less in the general idea of judicial review and judicial supremacy and 
more in the power of the Court to protect its own status from threats 
by the other branches of government. As a separation of powers case, 
Marbury is less about the Court’s power to decide the meaning of the 
Constitution (our modern understanding) and more about ensuring 
the Court remains safe from efforts to undermine its role in the 
constitutional scheme. 
CONCLUSION 
Of the three branches of our federal government, the judicial 
branch is uniquely vulnerable. The security of its place in our 
constitutional scheme depends very much upon the support of the 
other two branches. From the earliest days of the Republic, the 
Supreme Court has sought to protect and preserve the judiciary’s 
status and role. Most of those efforts have involved interbranch dialog 
and cooperation. On occasion, including in Lopez and Morrison, the 
Court has engaged in self-help. A focus on judicial self-preservation—
through docket control measures and other mechanisms—offers a 
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new framework through which to understand the work of the Court 
and the activities of the Justices beyond the courtroom. The 
framework invites shifting our attention from individual cases and 
discrete doctrines to a search for common threads that motivate and 
unify decisions across multiple areas of case law. The framework 
offers a new way of thinking about relationships among the branches 
of federal government, turning our eyes from the political impact of 
judicial decisions to the impact of congressional and executive actions 
upon the courts themselves. The framework invites also new attention 
to the relationship between federalism and separation of powers and 
the ways in which these two structural elements operate in sync to 
safeguard the judicial branch. Finally, the framework invites a closer 
examination of the multiple roles of Supreme Court Justices—as 
jurists deciding cases, as lobbyists of Congress and the Executive, and 
as the public voice of the third branch—and the ways in which those 
roles might be in tension or, instead, be played in pursuit of a single 
goal. 
